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1. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of network industries has emerged as a key issue on the European policy agenda.
One of these network industries is the telecommunications industry of which an overall review
of current European regulation is planned for 1999. A recent book  that the academic network1
CEPR (Centre for Economic Policy Research) published together with SNS (the Swedish Center
for Business and Policy Studies) identifies 10 conflicting priorities for regulatory policy makers
during the transition period from monopoly to competition in these industries. On this list, there
are some very general trade-offs (such as short-term versus long-term, equity versus efficiency,
slow versus fast, and rules versus discretion) while there is also a very specific one: infrastructure
versus service-based competition. It is this latter “conflicting priority” that is the focus of this
paper.
This paper results out of a study that was commissioned by VECAI, the Dutch Association of
Cable Operators. The central question formulated by VECAI is:
Is competition between infrastructure providers in the local loop a conditio sine
qua non for effective competition in the telecommunications market?
In order to provide an answer to this question, I have performed a study of the relevant literature
(both the academic literature as well as policy documents from the OECD, several national
regulatory agencies, such as the FCC (US), the CRTC (Canada), OFTEL (UK) and OPTA (The
Netherlands), and from market participants (KPN, VECAI) and market consultants (NERA,
OVUM) and have done independent research. This paper provides an overview of the lessons that
I learned.
The answer to the above central question cannot be a simple “yes” or “no”, it has to be more
sophisticated and context dependent. There are various alternatives available to generate effective
competition and to ensure that the benefits from competition (lower prices, more choice,
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innovation) are realized and which of these is best may depend on the market context and on the
institutional and regulatory framework. Competition between local loop infrastructures is one of
the possibilities to realize these benefits and it may very well be the most efficient one. As the
OECD has remarked, the situation in the Netherlands is favorable for infrastructure competition,
as the vast majority of Dutch households are connected to both telephony and cable tv networks,
hence, relatively speaking the cost of establishing competing infrastructures in the Netherlands
might be low. Hence, in the Netherlands, infrastructure competition might serve the public
interests best.
In many documents “infrastructure competition” (i.e. competition on the basis of alternative
physical infrastructures) is contrasted with “service competition” (i.e. competition between
providers of services that all make use of the same (monopolistic) network), and the question is
addressed which of these forms of competition is to be preferred. While it is useful to distinguish
these two forms as extreme, “ideal”, models, it should be realized that, in practice, there is a
continuum of possibilities and each market player will choose his own preferred combination,
given the possibilities that the regulatory system allows. To deal with this diversity, it is necessary
to take a more micro economic view and to study the different elements separately. Nevertheless,
it may be useful to discuss the issues at this general level first as the essential trade-off can be
easily identified there.
On the one hand, once there are competing infrastructures upstream, input prices for downstream
service providers will be lower and competition may flourish, this resulting in consumer benefits
(lower prices, higher quality, more variety, faster innovation). On the other hand, there is not yet
that much competition between infrastructures and considerable investment in upgrading of
networks may be needed before there can be viable competition downstream. In the meantime,
regulators may stimulate service competition by allowing easy or cheap access to the existing
monopolistic infrastructure. The question now is how far the regulator should go in this respect.
Obviously, pushing the access price down too low results in depressed demand for the competing
infrastructure, which may very well make the investments unprofitable.In short, heavy handed
regulation may forestall investment and may keep the monopoly in place. This trade-off was
identified in a former study by the CPB (the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
on the telecommunications market, where it was described as follows:
2 Y. Bernardt and M. Canoy: Competition in Communication and Information Services. CPB,
Den Haag, 1997
3  CEPR, p. 38-39
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“the government faces a paradoxical situation: low access charges are good for
competition in services but potential harmful for competition in infrastructure and
vice versa”2
It is this quote from the CPB-book that forms the starting point for this study. The central
question is: how to get out of this paradoxical situation?
This essential dilemma is also the most important one identified in the CEPR-study mentioned
above. In it, we can read:
Where it is thought that natural monopoly elements are important, it is often
argued that competition is best accommodated via service providers being granted
access to a monopoly network infrastructure. Although this type of competition
may deliver benefits in the short run as prices move closer to costs, it may
undermine ex ante investment incentives on the part of infrastructure firms,
particularly if access is granted on relatively favorable terms. The diminished
significance of natural monopoly elements in network industries means that
competition is now recognized to be a more powerful means of achieving both
efficiency and equity objectives than monopoly. Differences in opinion about the
form competition should take do arise, however. If policy makers encourage
competition via service providers, terms of access must be set so as not to
undermine ex ante investment incentives. This is especially important in dynamic
network industries like telecoms.  3
In another place, that same CEPR-book describes this trade-off in the following way:
“One important decision ... is the degree to which the speed of competitive entry
is important ... An important question is if entrants resell the incumbents' facilities,
4 CEPR, p. 150
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will they have the incentive to build their own networks? If there are few
incentives for construction of new infrastructure, then the longer term will see
little facilities entry. Thus the form and the time pattern of competition matters.
Moreover, it is regulation that affects the decision by firms of how and when to
enter. Regulation and competition are inexorably intertwined”.4
As competition and regulation are inexorably intertwined, the question is what form regulation
should take in order to ensure that the benefits from competition are reaped. The CEPR study,
however, does not provide a clear answer to that question. In this paper, we attempt to provide
elements of the answer. Staying, for a moment, at the aggregate level, two “extreme” regulatory
systems may be distinguished. The UK telecoms regulator, OFTEL, is of the view that only
infrastructure competition will bring benefits to the consumers and has implemented a policy that
is in line with this view. Access to existing infrastructure in the UK is relatively difficult, or
expensive, so that market players have an incentive to construct alternative infrastructure. At the
other side of the spectrum we find the US system in which there is strong reliance on service
competition. In the US, access to existing networks is easy (because of unbundling requirements,
the entrants pay only for what they use) and relatively cheap (i.e. it is cost based and the cost are
calculated in a favorable way). In between these two “ideal” models, we find the regulatory
systems of other countries and overall there is considerable variety.
In order to address the normative question of what form of competition and what regulatory
system is best, it is, because of the great variety observed in practice, necessary to move beyond
the simple infrastructure/service and UK/US dichotomies and to take a more micro view.
Therefore, this paper reviews in detail the various issues that arise and how the different
regulatory systems cope with them. In particular, we discuss the regulatory systems in Canada and
the Netherlands in addition to those from the UK and the US.
Within the European Union variety in regulatory systems is somewhat less because of the common
ONP framework. In essence, the ONP framework aims to promote competition and to generate
consumer surplus by ensuring interoperability of networks and by insisting that operators with
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significant market power (say those with market shares in excess of 25 %) make available their
networks, and various network elements, at cost based terms. As the ONP directives leave crucial
aspects open (such as: who is an SMP-operator? what requests for special access are
reasonable?), the National Regulatory Agencies have discretion in implementation and differences
in regulatory systems may arise even within the EU. Still, the framework is constraining: the EU
insistence on cost based access implies that the UK, for example, has had to change its policy. In
the UK parties that constructed own infrastructure could get interconnection from BT at favorable
terms, hence, access conditions were discriminatory and, therefore not cost based and thus in
violation of ONP-principles. One might, therefore worry that the European ONP-framework does
not provide enough incentives for investment in alternative infrastructure and whether it is in the
long term interests of European consumers. Indeed, in its proposal for research, VECAI showed
such worry and this motivated their second question: 
Are current ONP-rules barriers for the development of alternative
telecommunications networks and, hence, also for viable competition?
It is appropriate to ask this question now as there will be an overall review of the ONP-framework
in 1999. An answer to this question can, of course, only be given after it has been made clear what
the ONP rules are. We describe these in more detail in section 3 of the paper. In our opinion,
there is nothing intrinsic in the framework that forces an affirmative answer to this question,
however, a lot depends on how the framework is implemented. (For example, which cost are
taken into account?) Hence, also here a more detailed view is necessary. This is all the more
important as the rules do leave some (or a lot)) of freedom to national operators in the
implementation phase. Indeed, the following quote may show that national regulatory agencies
have a lot of discretion, in particular concerning the crucial issue of when, and for how long, to
insist on cost based tariffs and what exactly it means for tariffs to be cost-oriented:
“tariffs must be based on objective criteria and must in principle be cost-oriented,
on the understanding that the fixing of the actual tariff level will continue to be the
province of national legislation and is not the subject of open network provision
conditions. Where an organization no longer has significant market power in the
relevant market, the requirement for cost-orientation may be set aside by the
5 EU Full Competition Directive 96/C/62/04, Annex on Tariff Principles.
6 Market power refers to the ability to raise price above the competitive level for a non-transitory
period without losing sales to such a degree to make this unprofitable. The concept of “significant
market power” (SMP), however, is different. Whether an operator has SMP is determined by the
NRA, who has to take into account (in specified markets), the operator’s market share, its ability
to influence market conditions, its share of turnover, its financial strength, its control of access
to consumers, its experience, etc.
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competent national regulatory authority”.5
The quote makes clear that the concept of "significant market power" is crucial, but the European
Directives are not very precise at exactly this point. In principle, an operator with a market share
in excess of 25% is presumed to have "significant market power", but the condition is neither
necessary nor sufficient.  In addition, it is ambiguous how market shares are to be determined,6
furthermore, the way the relevant market is determined (essentially ex ante specification) is
different from the way this is done in competition policy (ex post, on the basis of detailed market
analysis). Hence, the NRA's have considerable freedom in determining when to impose cost based
tariffs , the market dilineation need not be the appropriate one, and the NRA's decision is not an
easy one. 
In addition, there are other aspects where the NRA's have a lot of discretion. The European
Directives mandate that access be provided at all points where the request to provide it is
reasonable, but as always it is not clear a priori which requests are reasonable and which ones are
not. Again this is a point where the NRA's decision is not an easy one. The following quote from
a recent paper on EU-regulation makes the point more generally, it argues that the issues that
regulators face are not trivial ones:
“However, the commission will have to tread carefully not to be drawn down the
path of over-regulation. To choose just one example, should incumbent firms be
required to unbundle their services as in the American model in the hope of
encouraging entry by firms who will add value in some way and resell? Or should
regulators follow the British model of not focusing on unbundling in the hope of
encouraging facilities-based entry? The proper course is not clear; either choice
7 L. Waverman and E. Sirel: “European Telecommunications Markets on the Verge of Full
Liberalization”. J. Econ. Perspectives 11, 4 (1997) 113-127
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is sure to provoke complaints.”7
This brings us, finally, to the question of the policy lessons for national regulators and to the
normative question of what type of regulation serves the public interest best. This question about
the lessons for policy, was the third one posed to us by VECAI:
What regulatory model would encourage competition between networks in the
local loop?
In a sense, the unconstrained answer to this question is easy: no regulation, with competition
policy guarding against anticompetitive behavior of the incumbent monopolist. However, this
answer is not satisfactory, as that regulatory model might not suit the consumers very well.
Hence, one might choose to reformulate this question as "what regulatory system would serve the
interests of consumers best? "Unfortunately, this latter, very general, question is difficult to
answer in specific terms. Nevertheless, we attempt to provide some insights. In order to do so,
we distinguish on the one hand the various aspects that the regulatory system is supposed to deal
with and, on the other, the diverse systems that exist in different countries. As far as the first
dimension is concerned, we consider both the wholesale market (interconnection and access) and
the retail market (retail price regulation and number portability). The countries that are reviewed
are Canada, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. The picture that emerges is a mixed one. The
issues are complicated ones and it is unclear whether strong conclusions can be drawn at the
moment.  We summarize our findings in section 9. For the moment, we just remark that it would
not seem prudent to bet all the money on “service competition”.
Although the report focuses on telephony and telephony regulation, we wish to stress that the
discussion actually pertains to modern telecommunications. Under the influence of technological
convergence, the traditional boundary lines between markets for telephony, information services
and broadcasting become blurred, and the VECAI questions posed above becomes relevant for
all these forms of data communication. Indeed, as it is expected that the market will grow
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considerably, the question will become more and more important. The local loop constitutes, for
some time to come, a bottleneck facility for providing modern telecommunications services and,
for some time still, the pressures for access to this bottleneck will increase. Hence, although the
discussion will be couched in terms of telephony it should be read with having the above in mind
and should be considered to deal with “access to broadband networks”.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide an overview of the
regulatory issues that the regulator is faced with. In section 3 we provide an overview of the
ONP-framework. Section 4 describes some basic economic lessons that the regulator could take
into account. It deals with the possible benefits associated with network duplication, the
possibilities of anti-competitive behavior of network monopolists, and the inherent drawbacks of
rate of return regulation to curb monopoly power. In particular, we discuss some simple economic
models of telecommunications in which the costs and benefits of competition in the local loop can
be discussed. We show that there may be multiple equilibria: if the regulator opts for heavy
handed regulation to stimulate service competition, then alternative infrastructure will not be built
and regulation will remain necessary also in the future. If, however, the regulator adopts light
handed regulation, there will be investment in alternative infrastructure and there will be no need
for further regulation. The welfare ranking of these equilibria depends on several parameters and
it is possible that the second equilibrium dominates the first. It thus follows that various beliefs
of the regulator may be self-confirming and that a policy of the type “regulation where
competition cannot be expected to develop” requires detailed market analysis to be successful:
a pessimistic regulator may prevent competition to develop, where competition would flourish
if the regulator were optimistic. After having discussed the basic issues at this general level, we
then detail the regulatory rules in the Netherlands, the UK, the US, and Canada in the sections 5-8
of this paper. Section 9 concludes by formulating the lessons that can be drawn from our
theoretical work and literature study. The lessons identify trade-offs, however, since empirical
material is scarce we cannot determine precisely to what side the balance will swing to. We hope,
nevertheless, that the structure that we provide will enable a more focused discussion on the pros
and cons of infrastructure competition versus service competition.
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2. REGULATORY ISSUES
In describing the issues that a National Regulatory Agency (NRA) has to deal with, we distinguish
between the wholesale market and the retail market. We start with the former.
2.1 THE WHOLESALE MARKET
1. Interconnection
Interconnection ensures the interoperability of networks: traffic that originates on one network
is interconnected to another network to terminate there. We will sometimes use terminating
access as being synonymous with interconnection. In dealing with interconnection, the following
regulatory issues arise: 
1 which network operators should be forced to offer interconnection?
2 at what network levels should interconnection be possible?
3 what should be the price of interconnection?
4 should a (public) reference offer be made?
5 should all interconnection agreements be public?
2. Indirect access
We speak of indirect access when a consumer who is connected to a network A has the ability to
contract his telecommunications services from another operator B.  In this case, A is said to offer
indirect access to B; B makes use of the facilities of A to provide the services to the consumer.
One form of indirect access is originating access or carrier selection. The customer keeps his
subscription with A, but contacts B for calls (through dialing an access code) and pays traffic
related costs to B. The regulatory issues that arise in relation with indirect access are:
1 who should offer indirect access?
2 what types of indirect access should be offered?
3 what should be the price of these various forms of indirect access?
4 what information about access agreements should be available to other market parties?
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It is useful in this context to dwell a little longer on the second question, i.e. on the various types
of indirect access. Let us first consider originating access in the case of plain telephony. One
question is: how easy should carrier selection be? We may distinguish between carrier pre
selection in which the access code is prefixed and the consumer is automatically connected with
the operator of his choice, and call by call selection in which the costumer has to choose an
operator for each call by dialing the appropriate access code first. There can also be a default
option: if no code is selected, the call goes through the network of a certain operator, usually the
incumbent. An issue that is important in this context is whether there should be easy access or
equal access. With equal access, the costumer has to choose a code for each operator and all
codes are equally long, there is number parity. With easy access, it is just not much more
cumbersome to select an entrant instead of the incumbent. OFTEL had the consulting company
NERA perform a cost benefit study on these various forms of indirect access, the conclusion
being that the cost of equal access outweigh the benefits. It was thus concluded that easy access
of alternative service providers, through 3 digit codes is sufficient. (See section 6 for more
details.) Nevertheless, the EU Numbering Directive (98/61/EC) requires member states to impose
an obligation on all operators with SMP to provide carrier pre selection as of 1.1.2000.
Indirect access may be even more important with respect to more modern services like fast
Internet access and other services (like video on demand) that require higher bandwidth. The
traditional telephony copper local loop cannot deliver such capacity, but modern xDSL
technologies allow to upgrade the copper loop. Technically, an appropriate modem is placed on
each end of the loop and the regulatory question now is whether indirect access should  also be
possible to the upgraded loop (this is called ADSL access in the Netherlands) or whether the
entrant could reasonably request unbundling of these modems and then provide the modems
themselves. This brings us to the issue of direct access.
3. Direct access
We speak of direct access to a consumer C when the operator B (who’s network originally is not
connected to C) leases (or buys) the line segment to C from network operator A. Hence, a part
of the access network of A (the local loop between C’s connection and the main distribution
frame of A’s network at the first local switch) is transferred to B. Alternative terms used for direct
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access are local loop unbundling and MDF access (MDF = Main Distribution Frame). The
regulatory questions again are: who should offer it, in what form, and under what conditions?
In relation to the upgrading of local loops to provide more capacity the question here is whether
there should be unbundling of the “naked” copper pair, or whether the loop could be leased
including the modems. The latter is called bitstream access. In the past, OFTEL has strongly
rejected the idea of forcing BT to offer direct access as this would run counter to the policy of
encouraging alternative infrastructure. In light of the increased demand for higher bandwidth
services, OFTEL is, at present, consulting on this issue again (see section 6). The Dutch regulator,
OPTA, has recently published guidelines on “direct access” to which we will return in section 5.
4. Resale
This is the case when a service provider, without its own network, buys capacity from a network
operator and resells ti to consumers. This does not seem to be much of an issue in the EU, but it
plays an important role in the US. I have little to say about it.
2.2 THE RETAIL MARKET
Traditionally, telephony service prices are unbalanced and geographically averaged, i.e. the fixed
subscription fee is typically too low to cover the cost of providing access and the tariffs do not
reflect the underlying geographic cost differences. The cross subsidies and associated distortions
imply that it is attractive for entrants to enter the areas with low costs (cities) or with heavy traffic
(business districts). As long as there are cross subsidies, there is no guarantee that only efficient
entry will occur: there may be cream-skinning. The task of the regulator is to stimulate efficient
entry and at the same time to protect the captive costumers. The following issues may be
distinguished.
1. Rebalancing
This amounts to increasing the subscription fee and decreasing the per minute price for traffic, so
as to eliminate the subsidies. This rebalancing is happening (or has happened) in most developed
8 This may be deliberate: forcing uniform tariffs on the incumbent makes it less atractive for him
to lower prices, hence, entry is made easier.




This amounts to allowing geographic differentiation in order to have the underlying cost
differences reflected in prices. In most countries this is not happening yet, frequently the national
law insist on uniform tariffs. While this distorts competition  and superior alternatives (such as the8
universal service fund) seem available, we will simply take this as given and refer to our earlier
publication on universal service for more details.9
3. Retail price control
In the starting situation of monopoly provision, there is retail price control to prevent the
monopolist from abusing his market power. Traditionally, many regulators made use of rate of
return regulation, but more and more we see a movement towards cost plus regulation, or price
cap regulation. With price cap regulation, there are questions relating to the length of the review
paper, the initial price, the per year price decrease, and the question of whether there is a global
cap or caps for individual services. With the other forms of regulation, there is the question of
how to determine return and/or cost and what rate of return to allow?
4. Rebates and predatory pricing
In principle, incumbents could engage in predatory pricing policies to deter entrants from entering
profitable markets. The question is whether there is a task for the regulator here. One could
(perhaps) prevent the practice by imposing a price floor ex ante, but one could also deal with it
ex post through generic competition policy. Again, this is an issue about which I have little to say
here, since it is only tangentially related to my assignment.
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5. Number portability
Number portability means that a costumer, who does not physically move to a different location,
but who wants to switch from telecoms operator A to operator B can do so and keep his number.
The policy reduces consumer switching costs and thus makes the market more competitive. No
wonder that operators are slow to implement it. Within the EU, number probability is compulsory
as of January 1, 2000. We will not deal with it in this paper.
2.3 CONCLUSION
In discussing the questions asked by VECAI, emphasis will be on aspects of 
1 interconnection,
2 indirect access,
3 direct access, and
4 retail price control,
where the latter is important since if a regulatory price ceiling is set too low, it reduces the scope
for competition. To put it differently, since the incumbent is active on both the wholesale and the
retail market there is the possibility of anti-competitive behavior through prize squeezes (high
interconnection rates combined with low retail tariffs). We deal with this possibility in section 4.
10 For a more extensive overview, see J. Pelkmans and D. Young “Telecoms-98. CEPS, Brussels,
1998
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3. OPEN NETWORK PROVISION
From the earliest days of EU liberalization, it was clear that there could be no internal market in
telecoms without open access to public networks. The ONP framework that was adopted in the
EU had the aim to promote open and efficient access to monopoly networks and to harmonize
conditions of use throughout the Community. Initially the framework applied to public operators
with exclusive rights, later, with the development of competition it was amended to apply to
operators with significant market power. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the ONP-
framework.10
The ONP concept was introduced in the Commission’s 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications
Services and given substance in Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28 June 1990. The purpose of
the ONP policy was to stimulate entry in the market for value added telephony services and to
ensure “fair” competition between incumbent and entrants. To establish these goals, the ONP
directives specified that access to networks should be open, i.e. conditions of access should be
objective, transparent, published and non-discriminatory. Furthermore, access can be restricted
only in cases of essential requirements (e.g. security of network operations).
The full competition directive (Commission directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996) extended the
ONP-directive to adapt to a more liberalized market, by abolishing all legal barriers for entry into
the telecommunications services and network markets. It added the condition that interconnection
and access prices should be cost based. This aspect was worked out further in the Interconnection
Directive (Council Directive 97/33/EC from June 97) which introduced the concept of operators
with significant market power (SMP) and which insisted that operators with SMP are subject to
more restrictive ONP-regulation. Specifically, SMP-operators are obliged to provide access and
bear the burden of proof that there access charges are cost based. NRA’s (national regulatory
agencies) can classify which operators have SMP, but normally a market share of 25% is
considered to be an indication that the operator has ONP.
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Three ONP-directives are relevant for our purposes: the leased lines directive, the revised voice
telephony directive and the interconnection directive. Each imposes special obligations on market
parties that are judged to have significant market power. We now describe the obligations that
these directives impose on these, so called, SMP-operators. 
Main Obligations imposed on SMP organizations :
1 ONP leased lines directive (92/44/EC, amended 97/51/EC)
(i) the provision of a minimal set of private circuits,
(ii) the publication of technical information, tariffs and terms and conditions,
(iii) the charges for leased lines have to be cost oriented and transparent,
(iv) the relevant private circuits have to be supplied in non-discriminatory ways.
2 ONP revised voice telephony directive (98/10/EC)
(i) to keep up to date information on the quality of service and to meet certain quality
requirements,
(ii) to comply with procedures set up by the NRA which deal with situations in which there
is interruption, termination, significant variation or reduction in availability of service, at
least to those organizations providing telecommunications networks or services,
(iii) to provide certain additional facilities (calling time identification, direct dial in and call
forwarding),
(iv) to deal with reasonable requests for special access to the network (16.1),
(v) the tariffs for access to and use of the fixed network must be non-discriminatory, they
must be sufficiently unbridled and they must be cost oriented,
(vi) to operate a cost accounting system that enables to implement (v),
(vii) discount schemes shall be transparent and be applied non-discriminatory.
3 ONP interconnection directive (97/33/EC)
(i) to meet all reasonable requests for access to the network at points other than those offered
11 It is not completely clear to me what the difference is between this requirement and
requirements 2 (iv) listed above. Does it go further (“aanbieden” instead of “in behandeling
nemen”)?
12 There is a third group with no rights and obligations, those not included in “Annex 2".
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to the majority of end users (4.2) ,11
(ii) to adhere to the principle of non-discrimination with regard to interconnection, in
particular, interconnection must be offered to others on the same terms as they provide
to themselves,
(iii) the charges for interconnection must be cost oriented and unbundled, based on cost
accounting systems which are approved by the NRA for the purpose,
(iv) to publish a reference interconnection offer,
(v) to keep separate accounts for interconnection activities and other activities, with the
interconnection activities being independently published and audited.
We now describe the Interconnection Directive (ICD) in somewhat more detail. This directive
aims to ensure that those operators that control bottleneck access to consumers should
interconnect with one another to ensure interoperability and universality of service. The
framework is reciprocal: those who have these obligations also have the right to interconnect.
Different types of operators are distinguished with different packages of rights and obligations
applying to them . Specifically, there are so called “Annex 2 Operators” and operators with12
"significant market power" (SMP). Annex 2 operators are eligible for special terms from operators
with SMP. Operators with SMP have special obligations imposed on them: they may not
discriminate, their interconnection agreements are public, they must make a reference offer and,
most importantly, their interconnection charges must be cost oriented.
Article 4 (1) of the Interconnection Directive states that “Organizations authorized to provide
public telecommunications networks and/or publicly available telecommunications services as set
out in Annex 2 shall have a right and when requested by organizations in that category, an
obligation to negotiate interconnection with each other for the purpose of providing the services
in question, in order to ensure provision of these networks and services throughout the
community”. Operators who provide public telecommunications services and who control
bottleneck facilities are automatically included in Annex 2, other licensed telecommunications
 OFTEL. Rights and Obligations to interconnect under the EU interconnection13
directive. Consultation document, March 1998.
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operators may or may not be included, the decision being made by the national regulatory
authority.
Note that the ICD imposes that the terms of interconnection do not depend on the characteristics
of the party that requests it, for example, interconnection terms do not differ according to whether
the party that requests it constructs own infrastructure or not. This directive thus forced the UK-
regulator to change its system as that was asymmetric. In the UK, individual obligations were
imposed on certain operators like BT and other operators which had so called “RCS-status”
(relevant connectable system) could impose these obligations. Basically, whether an operator had
RCS-status depended on whether it intended to invest in infrastructure, hence, the UK-system
effectively was biased in favor of operators that were building competing infrastructure. The
directive forced OFTEL to revise its policy, but according to OFTEL changes would not be large
as the set of Annex 2 operators would not be much larger than the existing set of operators with
RCS-status.  See section 6 for more details.13
As said above, operators with significant market power (SMP) have special obligations.
Furthermore, whether an operator has SMP essentially depends on whether or not the operator
has a market share of 25 % or higher. The ICD does not provide much more detail here, it leaves
a lot of discretion to national regulators. For example, it is left open how market share should be
determined (turnover, number of connection, or other). Furthermore, a market share above 25%
is neither necessary nor sufficient, the regulator should take other factors into account as well, and
has great discretion in declaring an operator to have SMP or not. Hence, there are a lot of
uncertainties still. At present, the NRA's are having consultation rounds to fill in these details.
There are remarkable differences between countries. For example, while OFTEL proposes to
measure market share by looking at market revenue, OPTA proposes to look at value added.
Remarkably, however, the directive specifies the relevant markets in an ex ante way, different
from the way the relevant economic market is defined by competition authorities. In particular,
the fixed telephone market, the leased lines market and the public market are distinguished.
14 Mark Schankerman. Symmetric regulation for competitive telecommunications. Info Econ and
Policy 8 (1996) 5f
18
Since there are extra obligations on market parties with SMP, the regulation is asymmetric.
Concerning the (un-)desirability of asymmetric regulation, we note the following. Players in the
telecommunications market occupy asymmetric positions. The question is whether, in order to
create a level playing field, the differences in starting positions are neutralized by differences in
the rules that apply to these players. In particular, is asymmetric regulation in favor of newcomers
necessary to stimulate competition? The position of the OECD with respect to this issue is
interesting here. In its Working Party on Telecommunication and Information Services Policies
it first (April 19997) argued in favor of symmetric treatment, but, in September 1997 it amended
this decision and argued in favor of asymmetric regulation in markets where effective competition
is not widely established. Unfortunately, it was impossible for me to access these documents. I
guess the argument amounts to pointing that asymmetric, see Schankerman.14
Recently, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have negotiated an
amendment of the ICD. This amendment requires NRA’s to:
(i) encourage the earliest possible introduction of number portability and to ensure that this
facility is available by January 1, 2000 at the latest,
(ii) require organizations with SMP to offer, at January 1, 2000 at the latest, carrier
preselection with a facility to override any preselected choice on a call-by-call basis by dialing a
short prefix; it shall be ensured that the associated interconnection rates be cost based.
Member states that can prove that the introduction of number portability or carrier preselection
would impose an excessive burden can ask for deferment beyond the deadline of January 1, 2000,
but still the services should be introduced.
We conclude this section with a couple of remarks on pricing issues. The Working Document on
Interconnection Pricing is a Liberalized Telecommunications Market that was issued by the ONP-
committee on July 7, 1997 proposes detailed costing and pricing prescriptions for interconnection.
It argues that interconnection prices should be based on forward looking long-run incremental
costs (LRIC), that such costs should be calculated on the basis of bottom-up
(economic/engineering)-models, and that the interconnection charges cannot be capacity-based,
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nor linked to retail prices (pp. 17-18).
The Commission’s Recommendation on Interconnection in a Liberalized Telecommunications
Market (October 15, 1997) gave broad support to the Working Document, but added some
changes as well. It recognized the need to include mark-ups to cover joint cost and recommended
to use activity based costing in order to minimize on joint and common cost. Furthermore, the
recommendation gave more scope for top-down cost approaches. As LRIC are low, it is not
surprising that entrants argue in favor of these. However, common costs are not incorporated into
LRIC and LRIC thus treats incumbents and entrants asymmetrically. This cost concept subsidizes
use of existing networks and thus may eliminate incentives to build own infrastructure. The
appropriateness of using a bottom up approach may be questioned as well. If the establishment
of networks is path dependent, i.e. the efficient way to extend or upgrade the network is based
on the current state of the network, there the relevant cost should take the existing state into
account.
The Working Document rejects the idea of capacity based pricing for interconnection.
Nevertheless, if capacity (at a switch) is binding, then economic efficiency demands that the
interconnection price includes a capacity charge, to reflect the opportunity costs of using the
switch. Here again, we see asymmetric treatment that favors entrants (as the incumbent bears the
ost).
15 For a very recent statement to that extent, see OPTA’s consultation document on price caps
from April 20, 1999, point 38.
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4. BASIC ECONOMIC INSIGHTS
In this section we briefly discuss some lessons that can be drawn from the economic literature on
network competition. The literature involved is huge and we do not attempt to provide a
systematic overview. Instead we focus on three simple insights:
(i) That duplication of networks need not be bad as it may result in direct consumer benefits.
(ii) That without competition in infrastructure, there may be a serious problem of the
monopolist trying to lever market power to the service market through vertical price
squeezes (raising rivals’ costs).
(iii) That strict rate of return regulation may have negative implications for entry and for
consumer surplus and welfare.
We elaborate on these points in each of the following subsections.
4.1 DUPLICATION OF COSTS NEED NOT BE BAD
In public discussions one sometimes hears the argument being made that competitive investment
in infrastructure involves duplication and, hence, is wasteful.  This argument is only partly true15
at best; it neglects the other side of the coin, that competitive infrastructure may bring consumer
benefits. As total welfare is the sum of profits and consumer surplus, the net effect of duplication
is ambiguous in general, but it may very well be positive in certain situations. Below we illustrate
by means of a simple example. We consider it useful to discuss this simple principle since
consumer benefits are diverse and broadly spread and, hence, tend to get out of sight, certainly
in a situation where the other side (investments in actual infrastructure) is very visible.
Consider the following simple example. On the supply side, a certain service can be provided
against zero marginal cost once a certain fixed cost F has been incurred. The demand side is
characterized by a downward sloping, linear demand curve, normalized to be given by D(p) = 1-p.
Consider first the case of unregulated, monopolistic supply. The monopolist will choose price pm




charges p  = ½ and makes profit 1/4 - F. The consumer surplus is given by the area under them
demand curve above the price, hence, this is equal to 1/8. The total welfare in the case of the
monopolistic supply thus is
Now consider the case of competition. The fixed cost F will be incurred twice and Bertrand
competition forces the price down to marginal cost. Hence, the firms’ revenues are zero and the
consumer surplus is 1/2. In this case of duopoly, total welfare (the sum of profits and consumer
surplus) is given by
We see that as long as F is sufficiently small (F < 1/16 in this example) total welfare is larger in
the duopoly case than in the monopoly case: if the fixed cost is not too large, it pays to duplicate
it as the benefits of competition exceed the additional cost.
The above example is meant for illustration only and it should not be taken literally. Indeed, the
model has several shortcomings. We briefly describe these now, but at the same time we describe
the general lessons that this example illustrates, general lessons that could also be demonstrated
by means of more convincing (but also more complicated) models.
One drawback of the above model is that it treats entry in an unsatisfactory way. Indeed it is not
clear why the second firm would enter given that it is not able to recover its fixed cost. The
problem is caused by the fact that the model assumes very intense (Bertrand) price competition.
With less intense competition, ex post profits of an (efficient) entrant would be positive and the
entrant would be willing to enter if its fixed costs are not too large. Of course, less intense
competition would imply less pressure on prices in the duopoly case, hence W  would normallyd
be somewhat lower. Still, since in the benchmark case the inequality is strict, the argument given
would remain valid in a range of cases.
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A second aspect in which the above example is somewhat unsatisfactory is that it compares
unregulated monopoly to full competition, i.e. it neglects the beneficial role that a regulator can
play. Indeed, with perfect regulation, the regulator would force the monopolist to charge price
equal to marginal cost, while the fixed cost F would be covered in some way from the consumer
side. This would result in monopoly being best and all duplication indeed being wasteful. In
practice, we cannot expect the regulator to be perfect, for example, simply because of the
information problems that she faces. Hence, it is more realistic to assume that the regulator can
increase the monopoly welfare somewhat , but that she cannot increase it to the first best level.
Consequently, the fact remains that, as long as the cost of duplicating infrastructure is not too
large, competition is preferred above regulated monopoly. Furthermore, the larger the
informational problems that the regulator faces, the less attractive the regulatory monopoly
becomes.
Thirdly, the model underestimates the benefits of competition. For example, the entrant might be
able to built the network at lower cost, or the second network may lift capacity constraints
(important in the case of strongly increasing demand), or it may enable new or different services
(product differentiation). The latter aspect may be most important: since competing network
owners will have an incentive to avoid too intense competition, they will aim to differentiate their
products; in addition investments of the one owner may induce higher investments of the other
in turn, this inducing a virtuous cycle.
We summarize the discussion from this subsection in the following proposition.
Proposition:
1. Competition brings consumer benefits, which should be traded off against the possible
additional cost that it entails. Even if competition involves inefficiencies in production
(for example because of duplication in infrastructure), it may result in total welfare
gains.
2. Ceteris paribus, competition is beneficial if it induces little productive inefficiencies (cost
of network duplication not too large) or if it is intense, such that it has a large impact on
consumer surplus.
3. Regulation tilts the trade-off in favor of monopolistic supply, but, because of the
16 This section is based on work of N. Economides, in particular, see Raising Rivals’ Costs in
complementary goods markets, March 1998.
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imperfections in the regulatory process (among others due to information problems), a
regulator will in general not be able to implement the first best and, as long as
competition does not introduce too much wasteful investment, it is to be preferred.
4.2 VERTICAL PRICE SQUEEZES AND RAISING RIVALS’ COSTS16
While in the previous subsection we focused on the direct benefits of competition for consumers,
we move on to discuss now benefits to firms who compete on the downstream (service) markets
from having access to competing upstream infrastructure. As the downstream competitors will
pass on some of these benefits to consumers, the model thus shows that there are indirect benefits
to infrastructure competition as well. We note that here the same qualifying remarks should be
made as in the previous subsection: the model is deliberately kept as simple as possible, hence,
it is not particularly realistic, however, the insights that it generates survive in  richer settings.
Consider a situation in which there is a firm that is both active on the upstream (infrastructure)
market as well as on the downstream (service) market. For simplicity we assume that one unit of
service needs one unit of infrastructure to be delivered to consumers (hence, service and
infrastructure are perfect complements). Again for simplicity, abstract away from cost: both
marginal and total cost are assumed to be zero. Finally, assume that this firm has a monopoly on
the infrastructure market, but that it faces competition (for simplicity from one firm only) in the
service market. We model competition in the service market à la Cournot, hence service firms
take demand as given and choose their output quantities simultaneously, with total output then
determining price and profits. (We view Cournot competition as a convenient shortcut for
imperfect price competition, remarking that capacity choice followed by price competition is
equivalent to Cournot competition.)
In our setting, the competing service firm is depending on the integrated firm to deliver the
necessary infrastructure. The question addressed is whether this integrated firm will have the







q1 ' (1%r) /3
p ' 1&q1&q2
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regulator is powerful and well-informed.
Suppose that the regulator imposes ONP-prices, i.e. the upstream monopolist cannot discriminate
between its own service division and the competitor and is, furthermore, forced to deliver the
input good at marginal cost (here equal to zero). Still in this extreme (favorable) case, it should
be expected that the monopolist has non-price instruments with which he can make life of the
competitor more difficult, think of delivering somewhat lower quality or of delivering, or
negotiating, with lower speed than feasible. The reluctance of KPN to provide interconnection
services to Versatel and the reluctance of that company to share base station sites for mobile with
Dutchtone provide two examples of the tactics that we have in mind. We represent such tactics
by an additional cost r (per unit of service) imposed on the competitor. Hence, the situation we
have in mind is that the integrated firm first decides on the level r of additional costs which it
wishes to impose on its competitors; given r there is competition on the downstream market and
r is chosen to maximize profits.
Let us first analyze competition in the service market. Label the integrated firm by 1 and the
competitor by 2. Let q  be the service output of firm i. Demand is now given by .i
Knowing r and deducing q , the service division of the integrated firm will choose q  such as to2 1
maximize its profits
Similarly, the competitor will choose q  such as to maximize its profits2
where the additional term reflects the additional costs imposed by the infrastructure division of
the competitor. In equilibrium, the output quantities are given by
q2 ' (1&2r) /3
p ' (1%r) /3
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with the resulting price for service being
These equations show the following effects of raising rivals’ costs:
(i) It forces the competitor into a less aggressive mood, he is forced to produce less,
(i) This in turn allows the integrated firm to increase its output and to capture more of the
market,
(ii) Which in turn leads to a price on the service market that is higher, hence, consumers
suffer,
(iii) As a consequence of (i) and (ii) the integrated firm profits from raising its rival’s cost:
both the price and its produced quantity go up, hence, revenues increase,
(iv) A simple computation, on the other hand, shows that the service firm is hurt by increases
in r: its revenues go down.
In sum: the integrated firm has an incentive to raise its rivals’s cost; it increases its overall profit
by doing so, however, not only is the competitor hurt by this strategy, the consumers are hurt as
well. In the case where the regulator would have no control over r, the integrated firm would push
r to the limit, in this case r = 1/2, where it is no longer attractive for the competitor to be on the
market. Hence, it would drive the competitor from the market by raising the competitor’s cost
and would restore the monopoly.
The example shows that non-price instruments are important for a regulator as well. The Dutch
regulator OPTA has well understood this point: it forces KPN to provide interconnection services
to Versatel and it forces KPN to share sites with Dutchtone. Still the question remains whether
such policies are sufficient to eliminate all strategic manipulations of the incumbent infrastructure
provider. Most likely this is not the case, especially because of problems of information,
verification and implementation. While extremes can be avoided, it is unlikely that the regulator
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can impose the first best. It is in this sense that competition between infrastructure providers could
be preferred. In our example, if there would be a competitive infrastructure provider, the
integrated firm would loose all its possibilities to raise its rivals cost, for, if it would,  the
competing service provider would then always turn to the competitive infrastructure.
We summarize the main lessons from this subsection in the following proposition.
Proposition:
1. An integrated firm that is both active on the infrastructure market and on the service
market and that has a monopoly on infrastructure has incentive to squeeze rivals on the
service market as it can increase its overall profits by doing so,
2. Not only are the competing service providers hurt by such a strategy, the consumers are
hurt as well as a consequence of the fact that competition will be less intense,
3. ONP-principles and anti-discrimination provisions can help to combat anti-competitive
behavior of incumbent infrastructure providers, but because of information problems and
other imperfections in the regulatory and legal process, these should not be expected to
produce a first-best outcome.
4. Eliminating the monopoly on the infrastructure by allowing infrastructure competition
reduces the attractiveness of the (former) infrastructure monopolist of the strategy of
raising rivals’ cost; with fully competitive infrastructure market, the problem of leverage
is eliminated completely.
4.3 REGULATION AS AN ENTRY DETERRENT
In this subsection we focus on the influence of retail regulation on market entry and we show that
strict regulation may be counterproductive as it may deter market entry. The basic argument is
simple: if the regulator forces retail prices to be low, then competitors have little room to compete
and they may well decide not to enter. If they do not enter, the monopoly is kept in place and
regulation will also be necessary in the future; if then again there is strict regulation, the situation
perpetuates and competition may not develop at all. If, on the other hand, the regulator opts for
light regulation, it may be easier to enter the market and competition may develop naturally,
making regulation superfluous. In such circumstances, what should the regulator do, should it go
p ' c%I
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for light-handed or for strict regulation? If all is well, the regulator will base its decision on a
market analysis and on an assessment of how likely it is that entry will take place. As we point
out, the interesting aspect now is that multiple equilibria may exist, different expectations will be
consistent at the same time. If the regulator is pessimistic about entry it will set a low price and
entry is indeed unlikely to occur. If, on the other hand, the regulator is more optimistic, it will set
a higher price and entry will indeed be more likely. 
We start with a very simple setting. A monopolist has invested I (per capita) in (sunk)
infrastructure and uses this to produce a service for consumers at constant marginal cost c. For
simplicity, we assume that consumers’ demand is inelastic, they are willing to buy up to one unit
of the service as long as the price does not exceed 1. Again for simplicity, we consider only one
period. The monopolist is supposed to be regulated under a rate of return regulation scheme.
Assuming, without loss of generality, the interest rate to be zero, the regulator will set a price so
that the net profits are zero, p - c - I = 0, hence
(4.3.1)
The price is equal to marginal cost, plus a mark up that is sufficient to cover the fixed cost of
infrastructure.
Now introduce the possibility of entry into this market. Assume there is an entrant who, by
sinking cost D, can produce the service at cost s. Assume initially (and for simplicity) that, if entry
takes place, there is price competition à la Bertrand. The entrant will thus enter if its total price,
D + s, is not larger than the regulated price. Obviously, if this possibility occurs with positive
probability, then (given our assumption of Bertrand competition) the monopolist will make zero
profits in some cases and the regulated price as in (4.3.1) is no longer sufficient to cover the fixed
investment costs. A regulator that uses rate of return regulation is forced to allow for a higher
price if there is a positive probability of entry.
The argument generalizes to other forms of competition. Since competition puts downward
pressure on revenue, investors will receive a lower return on their investments if entry occurs and




(p&c) (1&B(p)) ' I
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this argument also in the OPTA consultation documents. There it is argued that regulation will
be based on the WACC (weighted average cost of capital) of KPN and this WACC will be
determined by means of the CAPM. We read statements that increased competition leads to
increases in $ which in turn translates in higher prices.
Returning to our simple example, let B (p) be the probability that entry occurs if the regulator sets
the monopolist’s price at p. Given Bertrand competition (i.e. the winner, the firm with the lowest
price, takes all), the zero profit constraint , , now translates into
(4.3.2)
Since B(p) > 0, we see that any solution to (4.3.2) is larger than the solution to (4.3.1). Hence,
in this simple model, consumers are hurt by the possibility of entry. This is a direct consequence
of our “winner takes all consumption”. With Bertrand competition, there is no need for the entrant
to set a price below the regulated price, hence, consumers do not profit when entry occurs. In a
more realistic model, the entrant would be forced to set strictly lower prices than the incumbent
in order to attract costumers and consumers would thus benefit from entry.
There are now several possibilities with respect to the solution of (4.3.2). One theoretical
possibility is that there is no solution at all, that the right hand side of the equation is larger than
the left hand side for all values of p. In this case, taking the possibility of entry into account, the
investors always expect to loose money, no matter what price the regulator sets. Alternatively,
there are multiple solutions to (4.3.2) (we are assuming here that B(1) = 1, hence, that entry is
very likely if the regulator allows the monopolist to set the monopoly price.) This situation is





Figure 1: Multiple equilibria
In the case depicted in figure 1, there are two prices consistent with rate of return regulation, a
low one and a high one. In the case at hand, it is easy what a regulator that is only interested in
the consumer side should do, he should set the low price, but this is because of our extreme (and
unrealistic) assumption that consumers do not benefit from entry. Even in this case, however, it
is not clear that total welfare will decrease with entry, the total welfare being  the sum of
consumer surplus and the profit of the entrant. (The monopolist’s profit is zero no matter what
regulated price is set.)
In a more realistic model it might also happen that multiple prices are consistent with rate of
return regulation. Assume for simplicity, there are two such prices: a low one p  and a high onel
p . Assume for simplicity that B(p ) = 0 and B(p ) = 1 and that the entrant has to set a relativelyh l h
low price, p , in order to attract a sufficient number of costumers (i.e. there is a lot of consumerse
inertia). The trade-off that the regulator now faces, assuming that he is still only interested in the
consumer surplus, is more difficult. With strict regulation, all consumers are buying at price pl
from the monopolist. With lax regulation, some consumers buy at the higher price p  from theh
monopolist, while others buy at the lower price p  from the entrant. Consumer surplus might verye
well be higher in this second case.
B(p) ' Prob(D%s<p)
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Up to now, we kept B(p) as a parameter which could be manipulated at will. In full equilibrium,
however, B(.) has to be consistent with the entrant’s incentives, after all the entrant will enter only
if it is profitable to do so. It is reasonable to assume that the regulator will not be fully informed
about the entrant’s cost structure, but that the entrant knows the parameters D and s. Given p,
the entrant will enter if D + s < p, hence, we should have
(4.3.3)
Such considerations, however, do not change the arguments given above. What is important is
that B is increasing in p and that by manipulating the distribution functions of D and s one can
manipulate the function B. Hence, we did not spend to much time on this aspect.
However, it may be worthwhile to relate this aspect to the maintained assumption thus far of a
one-period model. Consider the case of really dynamic competition. As we argued above, with
consumer inertia the entrant will enter only if the monopolist prices at a high price, furthermore,
the entrant himself will be forced to price at a low price. Initially the market share of the entrant
may be small, with profits being small as well, but both may grow over time. Now the fixed cost
D, however, has to be incurred at the start. Clearly, the entrant will enter only if the discounted
expected profits exceed the cost and this may be the case only if the regulated price remains at
a high level for a sufficiently long period of time. Assume, in contrast, that the regulator uses a
long run cost model to determine the regulated price, hence, the regulator assesses what the long
term competitive price will be and imposes this already in the short run. In this case, it is less likely
that the entrant will be able to recover the investment cost D and entry may very well be blocked.
Just as in the simple example, this policy could hurt consumers.
We summarize the discussion from this subsection in the following proposition.
Proposition:
1. Setting the regulated price at a welfare maximizing level (or at a level that maximizes
consumer surplus) involves complex trade-offs, which can only be resolved by detailed
market analysis.
2. There may be multiple prices that are consistent with rate of return regulation. In such
17 The OPTA site (http://www.opta.nl) has some pages in English, but the documentation is not
extensive; the progress paper is information.
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cases, a lower price makes entry less likely and this may (or may not) hurt consumers’
interest, in particular when the entrant would allow the consumers to buy at a lower
price, or to buy a different variety.
3. Strict regulation may be a barrier to entry and, hence, may hurt consumers’ interests.
4. Cost based prices may be too low to allow competition to develop, in particular if these
costs are “long run costs”.
5. Different beliefs of the regulator may be self confirming. If she believes entry to be
unlikely, then she will set a low price and entry will be unlikely; if she believes entry will
be more likely, she will set a higher price and, indeed, entry will be more likely.
5. MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NETHERLANDS
With this section, we start our overview of developments in various countries, describing how the
different regulatory agencies have tried to cope with the challenges put to them. We start with the
Netherlands, of which our description is most extensive, this because of the fact that, within the
English language literature, one does not find too much information.  One of our aims is to fill17
this gap. We first discuss the wholesale market and start with interconnection in section 5.1. Next,
we describe the evolution in the thinking about whether the local loop is an essential facility
(section 5.2). Special access, and in particular MDF-access is then discussed in section 5.3. The
final subsection deals with the retail market.
5.1 INTERCONNECTION
We provide a historical overview showing that the initial policy proposals were favorable for
alternative infrastructure providers, but that, over time, the advantage that such providers had
over pure service providers was gradually eliminated. The policy changes were induced by ONP-
regulations. Within that framework, they seem to be based on sound economic reasoning.
On March 20, 1997, ministerial guidelines on interconnection are published. These distinguish
18 Cost of local loop have to be recovered from originating traffic.
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between originating and terminating access. It is proposed that in the latter case the
interconnecting party does not have to pay for the use of the local loop, but that the
interconnecting party has to pay in case of originating access. The immediate consequence, of
course, is that the price for originating access is much higher, hence, that parties are given
incentives to invest in alternative infrastructure. Indeed, Dutch policy at the time aimed to
stimulate such infrastructure competition and, given the high penetration rate of cable TV in the
Netherlands, such a policy could make sense. The concrete proposal involves sharing the cost of
the local loop by all users in proportion to the use they make (in minutes) of the local loop. The
Guidelines are published in  the Staatscourant on June 5, 1997 and become effective at that time.
In the meantime, there is an interconnection conflict between Telfort and KPN. The conflict
(which originates in February 1997, but eventually is decided upon only in June 1998) concerns
both originating and terminating access. The parties dispute whether the minister has authority
to resolve the conflict, as this is special access. On the basis of ONP directive 95/62/EC, KPN has
to offer special access, but this directive is not yet incorporated into national law. Since it will be
before long, the minister decides to handle the case and she makes a ruling on June, 26, 1997. She
maintains the difference between originating and terminating access and wants to allocate the
costs of the local loop exclusively to originating access, the principle being that “het aansluitnet
volledig moet worden gefinancieerd uit opbrengsten van uitgaand verkeer” . The minister argues18
that this principle is also desirable for a policy perspective because this stimulates the construction
of alternative networks. She accepts the consequence of delaying competition at the service level.
Indeed Telfort claims that the resulting tariffs are such that it can offer local calls only with a
negative margin. The minister fixes interconnection tariffs on the basis of the principles outlined,
but these are preliminary as KPN does not yet have an approved upon accounting method. To
comply with ONP-directives, the minister orders that an accounting  model be developed for the
purpose.
When the Dutch telecoms regulator OPTA starts its activities on August 1, 1997, it is immediately
confronted with appeals by both KPN and Telfort to the ministerial decision on interconnection.
Furthermore, it is charged with the task to develop an appropriate accounting method to
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determine interconnection prices. OPTA starts immediately by issuing a consultation document
on cost allocation for interconnection and special access (22/8/97). In this document, OPTA
announces that the local loop deserves special attention and that about this latter topic there will
be a separate consultation process. 
The consultation document on how to incorporate the cost of the local loop appears on February
4, 1998 and in it OPTA proposes to revert the former ministerial decision on interconnection
pricing and the decision in the Telfort conflict. Recall that these decisions were based on two
principles:
i) The cost of the local loop are incorporated in tariffs for originating access, not in those
for terminating access,
ii) These cost are per minute, the cost unit is the total cost of the local loop divided by the
number of minutes of outgoing traffic from the local loop.
OPTA makes clear that, for at least 4 reasons, this is an undesirable system:
a) It does not take into account the subscription fees, that KPN gets,
b) It puts competitors at a disadvantage,
c) It induces arbitrage,
d) It is inconsistent with the fact that the cost of the local loop is fixed and sunk, i.e. not
traffic related.
The document thus basically argues that the earlier Ministerial Guidelines and decision were based
on flawed economic reasoning. Furthermore, the system is particularly undesirable as it also works
out to hinder competition. An example makes this clear.
Suppose the local loop has 8 mln connections, that cost 4 bln/year and suppose there are 40 bln
minutes use of the local loop per year of which the incumbent carries 90%. The charge for
network use now is 10 cts/minute. The incumbent covers part of the cost through fixed charges,
say ƒ 27.50 per month for a total of 8 mln connections, yielding 2.64 bln on a yearly basis. The
access deficit is 4-2.64-0.1x40x0.1=0,96 (cost-monthly fees-contribution from competitors)
resulting in 2.64 cts per minute (divide through by the 36 bln minutes that KPN carries). One sees
that whereas competitors face a per minute costs of 10 cts, KPN only has a per minute cost of
2.64 cts, the situation is anti-competitive. Note that keeping the system, but allowing KPN to
rebalance its tariffs, would lead to a further improvement of KPN’s position.
34
To remedy the situation, OPTA proposes to separate access to a network from use of that
network and to price the two separately. A consumer can then have an access contract with KPN
and a traffic contract with a competitor, perhaps the competitor could also take over the access
contract, so that the consumer would deal only with one party. Such a situation would give
further arguments for tariff rebalancing, i.e. have both access and traffic tariffs in relation to costs.
Of course, such a policy is completely in line is in line with the EU document on Interconnection
Pricing, see p. 18 of that document in particular. As rebalancing would imply higher tariffs for
access, it would also improve the competitive strength of those who offer competing access
services. Obviously, the lower interconnection tariffs also improve the situation for competing
service providers as they increase the margin on which they can compete. Overall, the market
would thus be more competitive. 
When making this proposal, OPTA rejects any other method by which the cost of the local loop
would be covered by traffic related tariffs, hence, also the proportional method that was proposed
by KPN. In this method, one looks at the access deficit and divides this in proportion to the
outgoing traffic. One argument given for this rejection is that this system would lead to
asymmetric treatment between carrier pre-selection and carrier selection. Furthermore, the EU
has explicitly rejected the idea of including an access deficit contribution in the traffic for
terminating access. The EU position w.r.t. originating access, however, is not completely clear
yet.
At about the same time, there is a second interconnection conflict, this time between Enertel and
KPN. Enertel demands access and interconnection at the lower level of the local switch, i.e. the
“nummercentrale”. Concerning such access, OPTA reasons (in its decision dated 17/12/97) that
KPN should have foreseen demand for interconnection at this level, especially since it is common
in various other countries (also in the UK) and since this is mentioned by the European
Commission as one of the three levels where interconnection is possible (recommendation on
pricing 3/11/97). Note that such access is especially attractive at places where there is a lot of
traffic, such as the Amsterdam business district. Although KPN argues that it is difficult to
provide such access at the level of the “nummercentrale”, also because of the fact that it has
different types of local switches, OPTA orders KPN to offer it and it sets (preliminary) tariffs for
both interconnection at the level of the “verkeerscentrale” and at the level of the
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The consultation on interconnection and the cost of the local loop, results in OPTA publishing
new Guidelines on 27/3/98. Next, on April 3, 1998 OPTA decides in the Telfort/KPN conflict:
the cost of the local loop cannot be incorporated in originating access tariffs. As argued before,
the market thus becomes more competitive, KPN's position is  challenged and it desires to
rebalance its tariffs. OPTA does not oppose such rebalancing: as of July 1998, KPN's subscription
charges increase by some 25% and there is a corresponding lowering of tariffs for traffic.
With the  publication of its decision on cost based interconnection tariffs from July 1, 1998,
OPTA terminates (for the moment) the entire process concerning interconnection costs and
prices. The interconnection tariffs are now cost oriented (EDC) as the ONP interconnection
directive demands. The proposed system is as follows. Each year on May 1, KPN will propose
preliminary tariffs for the next year (from July 1 ) and final tariffs for the previous year. OPTAst
will judge these tariffs on the basis of both a bottom-up and a top-down cost allocation model.
Starting point is the existing cost allocation model of KPN, to which forward looking elements
are added, thus moving towards current cost accounting. It is found that KPN’s network is not
fully efficient and there is thus an efficiency reduction, however, costs are not based on the full
efficient network as KPN is not the only one to blame for the inefficiency (it is partly government
induced). The local loop is valued at historic cost, but traffic independent cost cannot be
incorporated in interconnection tariffs. Tariffs are based on cost thus calculated, allowing for a
return on assets (based on the WACC-method) of 12.2%. Tariffs will be adjusted yearly and it is
considered desirable to limit fluctuations from year to year. A system to limit fluctuations still has
to be developed, however. A distinction between peak and off-peak rates is allowed, the time
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periods being the same as for retail tariffs.
The following table gives the interconnection prices as they hold between July 1, 1998 and
July 1, 1999. We note that, in European perspective, the Dutch interconnection tariffs are on the
low end.
Period 1 July 1998 - 1 July 1999
Set-up Conveyance
Average Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak
local terminating 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.7 0.9
regional terminating 2.4 2.1 1.5 2.4 1.3
national terminating 2.9 2.5 1.8 2.9 1.5
local originating 2.0 1.7 1.2 2.0 1.1
regional originating 2.7 2.3 1.7 2.7 1.4
national originating 3.2 2.8 2.0 3.2 1.7
5.2 THE LOCAL LOOP: AN ESSENTIAL FACILITY?
In a sense the answer to the question posed in the title is easy: since there is investment in
alternative infrastructure, the local loop does not satisfy the usual conditions for an essential
facility; apparantly it is economical to make the investment. In this subsection we quote
extensively from OPTA documents to show that the Dutch telecoms regulator argues differently.
The quotes nevertheless show the evolution in OPTA’s thinking, while in the earlier consultation
documents we find clear statements that the local loop is essential, OPTA carefully avoids the use
of the word “essential facility”, in the most recent guidelines on MDF-access (See Sect. 5.3).
In its document on how to incorporate the cost of the local loop in interconnection and access
tariffs, OPTA is quite outspoken about whether the local loop should be considered an essential
facility or not. We list the relevant sections from that document. The first that we quote (31)
states that access to the local loop is essential for entrants to compete as the costs to duplicate
it are prohibitive. The second paragraph (32) states that mobile is no comparable alternative, while
according to (33) the same holds for the cable network, especially since the cable sector is not
very concentrated (34), the conclusion (in 35) thus being that, for the moment,  the local loop is
an essential facility .
19 Andersen Management International, An outline of access models in order tot stimulate
competition at access network level (nog te publiceren).
17 Zie ook: Verdonck, Klooster & Associates, De kabel: werk aan de elektronische snelweg,
onderzoek in opdracht van het Ministerie van economische Zaken, 12 november 1997.
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31.Het college is deze opvatting ( dat vergoeding van de kosten van het
aansluitnet  moet zijn vanuit concurrentie oogpunt, EVD) toegedaan omdat in
deze fase van de liberalisering het aansluitnet van PTT Telecom voor veel nieuwe
aanbieders onmisbaar is. Dit fijnmazige aansluitnet is immers (o.a. door de hoge
graafkosten) alleen tegen hoge kosten te dupliceren. Het zelf aanleggen van een
geheel nieuwe vaste infrastructuur is bovendien tijdrovend, zowel door de omvang
van een dergelijk project, als door de intensieve afstemming die het vergt met
grondeigenaren.
32. Een draadloze infrastructuur als volwaardig alternatief voor het vaste
aansluitnet komt voorlopig niet beschikbaar. In een recente studie van Andersen
Management International in opdracht van OPTA wordt zelfs betwijfeld of dat op
langere termijn het geval zal zijn.19
33.Nieuwe toetreders zijn dan ook in eerste instantie aangewezen op de bestaande
fijnmazige infrastructuren: die van PTT Telecom en de kabeltelevisie-netten
(KTV-netten). De KTV-netten bieden echter op korte en middellange termijn
evenmin een alternatief dat op grote schaal kan worden gebruikt. Deze netten
moeten namelijk voor het overgrote deel nog geschikt gemaakt worden voor de
afwikkeling van telefonie en andere tweewegdiensten.20
34. Bovendien zal een dienstaanbieder die zijn diensten in heel Nederland wil
aanbieden, vanwege het grote aantal verschillende KTV-aanbieders met veel
verschillende regionale of lokale exploitanten over de toegang tot hun netten
moeten onderhandelen. Of die toegang dan ook daadwerkelijk en tegen redelijke
tarieven wordt geboden blijft een onzekere zaak. Een nieuwe aanbieder zal vaak
concurreren met de plaatselijke kabelexploitant zelf, waarbij kan worden
aangetekend dat er noch in de huidige, noch in de voorziene Nederlandse
18 Zie § 59 van de Mededeling van de Commissie over een ontwerp-bekendmaking betreffende
de toepassing van de mededingingsregels op overeenkomsten inzake toegang tot de
telecommunicatiesector, 97/C 76/06 van 11 maart1997. Zie in het bijzonder voetnoot 50.
22 Bij andere tweewegdiensten kan men denken aan internet access (inclusief e-mail), video on
demand etc.
38
telecommunicatieregelgeving, een algemeen recht bestaat voor derden om van
deze lokale infrastructuren gebruik te maken. Dat recht komt er pas als de KTV-
exploitant een partij met aanmerkelijke macht op de telefoniemarkt is geworden.
35. In de praktijk zullen (potentiële) aanbieders van telefoniediensten daardoor
voorlopig overwegend aangewezen zijn op het aansluitnet van PTT Telecom. Dit
net kan dan ook worden beschouwd als een 'essentiële faciliteit' zoals bedoeld
door de Europese Commissie.  21
Let us now turn to the consultation document on special access from June 4, 1998.Some of the
above arguments are repeated in slightly different terms. The first paragraph (55) argues, that
residential costumers and small businesses will frequently not have a choice of infrastructure
provider, among others because of the fact that there is little upgrading of cable networks. The
second argues that indirect access cannot de relied upon to provide all services for which there
is effective demand. The third (57) questions whether carrier select services will be offered for
local services and argues that these are particularly important because of internet access. 
55. Kleinzakelijke (en particuliere) eindgebruikers zouden in beginsel tussen
aanbieders kunnen kiezen als zij een kabelaansluiting hebben en als, naast de
traditionele dienstverlening door de concessiehouder KPN Telecom, de
kabelexploitanten hun net geschikt zouden maken voor telefonie en andere
tweewegdiensten. De aansluiting is immers al aanwezig. In de praktijk komen
tweewegaansluitingen op kabel-tv-netten echter minder snel beschikbaar dan
verwacht. Daar komt nog bij dat lang niet alle kabelexploitanten hebben besloten
om telefonie of andere tweewegdiensten  aan te bieden. De verwachte penetratie22
voor telefonie en snelle internet-access op kabelnetten is in 2000 ongeveer 10%
23 Rapport Verdonck, Klooster & Associaties, November 1997
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van het aantal aansluitingen.23
56. Kleinzakelijke gebruikers en particulieren zijn daarom vooral aangewezen op
de aansluiting van KPN Telecom, waarover ze via de dienst “carrier selectie”
desgewenst een andere aanbieder kunnen kiezen. Het gebruik van de aansluiting
van KPN Telecom om diensten van een andere aanbieder te bereiken beperkt de
keuzevrijheid van die eindgebruiker tot die diensten, die door het net van KPN
Telecom worden ondersteund. De dienst “carrier select” van KPN Telecom
beperkt zich tot telefonie en ISDN. Dat betekent dus ook dat een dienstaanbieder
alleen die diensten kan aanbieden die door het net van KPN Telecom worden
ondersteund. Hierdoor bestaat het risico, dat een aantal diensten om die reden niet
tot ontwikkeling kan komen. Voorbeelden zijn de dienst “Completion of calls to
busy subscribers” (automatisch opnieuw oproepen als een bezette lijn weer vrij
komt) of “Call deflection” (de gebruiker beslist op het moment van binnenkomen
van een gesprek om het te accepteren of door te sturen naar een ander nummer).
57. Daarnaast is het de vraag of carrier select diensten voor lokaal verkeer wel tot
ontwikkeling zullen komen. Lokaal verkeer is met name van belang in verband met
de toegang tot aanbieders van internetdiensten (ofwel Internet Service Providers
of ISP’s). Het internetverkeer ontwikkelt zich stormachtig, zowel in toename van
het aantal abonnees als in het aantal toepassingen. Het resultaat is een grote
toename van het lokale verkeer. Ook maken eindgebruikers meer en meer gebruik
van ISDN-2 abonnementen bij KPN Telecom om een snelle toegang tot het
internet te verkrijgen en daarnaast de mogelijkheid te hebben van simultaan
telefoneren en “internetten” binnen een bedrijf of huishouden. De groei van ISDN
aansluitingen in grafiek 1 illustreert de grote vraag naar snelle toegang tot het
Internet.
In point 88 of the consultation document we find a reference that, at the moment, service
providers are completely dependent on KPN’s network. While in the future there may be
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competition and regulation can be relaxed, this is not true at present. Hence, this can again be
interpreted  as the local loop being an essential facility.
88. Het aansluitnet van KPN is op dit moment zonder twijfel de belangrijkste vaste
telecommunicatie-infrastructuur. Dienstaanbieders zijn voor de afzet van hun
diensten geheel afhankelijk van dit net. In de toekomst verwacht het college wel
dat andere vaste telecommunicatienetten tot ontwikkeling zullen komen. Ook
zullen de mobiele en vaste telecommunicatienetten gaan convergeren. Op termijn
kan dit betekenen dat er meer ruimte wordt gelaten voor bepaalde elementen,
waaruit de tarieven voor diensten die zijn gebaseerd op originating access zijn
opgebouwd. Indien er voldoende concurrentie op de markt voor infrastructuur
zou komen, zou de markt in beginsel haar werk doen. Op dit moment doet, zoals
gezegd, die situatie zich echter niet voor. Het college verneemt graag de visie van
marktpartijen op deze gedachtengang.
OPTA concludes on the basis of these arguments that it is important to insist on local loop
unbundling. It is remarkable that it takes 9 months for OPTA to make up its mind, a decision on
MDF-access only appears on March 12, 1999.It is equally remarkable that the words “essential
facility” are carefully avoided in the guidelines on MDF-access. In the next subsection , we
provide more details on the consultation document on special access and on the guidelines for
MDF-access.
5.3 SPECIAL ACCESS
Special access is defined as access to a telephony network at another place than is available to the
majority of users. The ONP-directives state that SMP-operators have to honor reasonable
requests for special access, but the decision what requests are reasonable, is for NRA’s to take.
Several types of special access can be distinguished. For our purposes, the distinction between
direct access and indirect access is important. We speak of indirect access when an operator needs
to make use of facilities of another operator to connect to a consumer. Direct access means that
a consumer is directly connected to the network of the operator with whom he contracts. We now
briefly discuss indirect access, which is also called originating access, and which is relatively
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unproblematic. Thereafter, we move on to discuss direct access, which is also called MDF-access.
In the latter case, the competitor connects directly to the consumer’s local loop via the main
distribution frame; on the other side of the MDF, the line of the consumer is connected to the
facilities of the competitor (co-location). The competing operator also takes over the subscription
and the consumer only deals with competing company, not with the incumbent monopolist.
Originating access is also sometimes called Carrier Selection. It is the form of special access
where end users route their calls through another operator than the one to which they are directly
connected. The user keeps his subscription with the existing operator, but is billed for his calls by
another operator. Two forms of carrier selection can be distinguished: call by call select (for each
separate call, the user selects an operator) and carrier pre-selection. In the latter case, the user
pre-selects an operator. The first form can be implemented with a default operator in case of no
pre-selection, the second form could allow call by call override. EU-countries have committed
themselves to implement the first form by 1/1/98 and the second form by 1/1/2000. A question
is whether carrier select should also be possible for local calls. Apparently, the EU insists on this.
An important question being presently discussed European wide, is whether it is sufficient to rely
on indirect access for competition ,or whether it is essential for new sevice providers to have
direct access to the consumers. The question is especially important in the context of fixed-mobile
convergence. In this context also the concept of ADSL-access is relevant. ADSL is a technique
to increase capacity of lines. The existing copper wires do not have enough capacity to enable
new broadband services, such as video on demand and quick internet access. However, by putting
ADSL-modems on both sides of the access line (one in the consumer's home, the other in between
the MDF and the first switch), the capacity can be increased so as to enable data transport with
a downward speed of 2-6 Mbit/s and this makes the new services possible in addition to the
existing telephony service. We can now speak of the ADSL-connection, consisting of the existing
connection line, together with the two moderns. The relevant regulatory question now is: is a
demand for access to the ADSL-connection reasonable?
Let us return to direct access in the case of the Netherlands. In the case of the Netherlands, MDF-
access ( a form of direct access) played first a role in the Enertel conflict as  Enertel had asked
KPN to provide unbundled access to the local loop. Policy with respect to direct access differs
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in different countries. In Germany, Canada and the US, MDF-access is compulsory. In the UK,
OFTEL wants to promote investment in infrastructure and, therefore, prohibits access at this low
level. OPTA rules ( in its decision from 17 December 1997) that it would be unreasonable of KPN
not to make an offer for MDF-access, but it considers it premature to discuss the tariffs for such
special access, especially in light of the fact that Enertel’s demand is rather unspecified. It
however does order KPN to make a reference offer. Concerning the appropriate tariff, OPTA
notes that MDF-access involves the line excluding the “lijnkaart”. Since the subscription includes
line plus linecard, it stands to reason that the tariff for MDF-access lies below the monthly
subscription fee.
OPTA announces that the issues will be taken up further in a consultation round. Consultation is
considered necessary as this is an important issue and since the ONP-directives concerning
interconnection (30/6/97) instruct regulators to encourage operators to offer special access.
Furthermore, operators with significant market power have to honor any reasonable request for
access. They should offer access in a non-discriminating, transparant way, according to cost-
based-tariffs. In particular, no discrimination is allowed between competitors and own daughters,
hence, unbundled access has to be offered and the user should pay only for that part of the
network that he actually uses.
In the consultation document on special access (June 4, 1998), OPTA states that it considers
MDF-access to be necessary to make possible, resp. enable competition on the market. This is
because there are few alternatives (no pre-selection yet, alternative infrastructure only in a few
places). See  the quotations in the previous subsection. Hence, OPTA proposes to impose MDF-
access on operators with SMP. The argument is given in point 72 of the document.
72. Het college acht deze vorm van bijzondere toegang tot de aansluitlijn van de
dominante aanbieder, zoals eerder vermeld, noodzakelijk voor het tot stand
komen, c.q. bevorderen van daadwerkelijke concurrentie.(....) 
However, OPTA also indicates that it is willing to limit this obligation to a temporary period, of
say 5 years, just as is the case in Canada, as it is possible that the market will develop in such a
way that the obligation will no longer be necessary then.
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73. Het college is vooralsnog van mening dat de huidige Nederlandse
marktsituatie (geen preselectie; beperkt reëel aanbod van alternatieve lokale
netten) bijzondere toegang tot ontbundelde netelementen noodzakelijk maakt. Dit
neemt niet weg dat er ontwikkelingen in de markt kunnen ontstaan, waardoor
deze asymmetrische plicht niet langer het doel dient waarvoor hij in het leven
wordt geroepen, namelijk: de totstandkoming van daadwerkelijke concurrentie.
Van marktpartijen met (deels) een eigen net mag worden verwacht dat zij meer en
meer, ten behoeve van hun klanten, eigen aansluitingen zullen creëren. Daarom is
het college in beginsel van mening dat de bedoelde verplichting voor dominante
aanbieders om te voldoen aan redelijke verzoeken om bijzondere toegang tot de
aansluitlijn in de tijd beperkt zou kunnen worden. In Canada is de asymmetrische
plicht om toegang te bieden tot de ontbundelde aansluitlijn aan een beperking (van
vijf jaar) gebonden. Het college denkt vooralsnog dat het goed zou zijn om na een
periode van vijf jaar de ontwikkeling van concurrentie op aansluitingen te
evalueren en alsdan te besluiten of de plicht om bijzondere toegang tot de
aansluitlijn nog beantwoord aan het doel van die plicht. De invoering van carrier
preselectie uiterlijk per 1 januari 2000 (zie ook hoofdstuk 2, onderdeel 2.3) kan
wellicht een impuls geven aan de daadwerkelijke mededinging op dit gebied. Ook
de evaluatie van de ONP-richtlijnen in Europees verband eind 1999 kan een rol
spelen voor de uiteindelijke periode waarin de plicht om bijzondere toegang tot
de aansluitlijn te bieden gehandhaafd blijft.
OPTA also discusses the possible negative consequences of opening up KPN’s network for
alternative investment in the local loop, but argues that these arguments cannot be decisive since
access to the incumbent’s infrastructure for service competition to develop(paragraph 59). In
addition, OPTA argues that it has helped providers of alternative infrastructure by insisting on
cost oriented subscription fees for KPN and number portability (60). Finally, (61) argues that
there is other markets than plain telephony that are relevant for cable networks. 
59. Het verlagen van drempels bij het gebruik van de infrastructuur van KPN
Telecom roept de vraag op wat het effect zou zijn op de concurrentiepositie van
aanbieders van alternatieve infrastructuur, zoals bijvoorbeeld kabelexploitanten.
24 Consultatiedocument kostenvergoeding aansluitnet, 4 februari 1998
25 Richtsnoeren kostenvergoeding aansluitnet, Staatscourant 1998, nr. 62, 27 maart 1998
26 One-stop shopping: alle diensten afnemen van dezelfde leverancier (1 rekening ontvangen, 1
aanspreekpunt hebben)
27 Rapport Eutelis Consult, december 1997
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De vraag naar gebruik van hun infrastructuur zou kunnen verminderen. Het
college heeft bij de consultatie over de kosten van het aansluitnet  aangegeven dat24
dit aspect echter niet doorslaggevend kan zijn om van drempelverlagende
maatregelen af te zien. Daarvoor is laagdrempelige en vooral snelle toegang tot
de infrastructuur van de dominante aanbieder te belangrijk voor de
totstandkoming van concurrerende dienstverlening. 
60. Naar aanleiding van bovengenoemde consultatie heeft het college besloten25
dat het abonnementstarief dat KPN Telecom in rekening brengt aan haar
eindgebruikers kostengeoriënteerd dient te zijn. Dit is in het voordeel voor
aanbieders van alternatieve infrastructuur. Het betekent dat zij een betere
uitgangspositie krijgen om met dit abonnementstarief te concurreren. Dit tarief
komt immers hoger te liggen als er geen subsidie plaatsvindt vanuit de
verkeersopbrengsten. Overigens wordt de concurrentiepositie van aanbieders van
alternatieve infrastructuur in belangrijke mate door andere aspecten beïnvloed,
zoals een snelle (en voor de eindgebruiker laagdrempelige) invoering van
nummerportabiliteit. 
61. Tenslotte kan worden opgemerkt dat er diverse redenen zijn om in alternatieve
infrastructuur te investeren. Daarbij speelt zeker niet alleen een rol of een met
KPN Telecom concurrerende telefoondienst kan worden aangeboden. De
mogelijkheid om ook andere diensten - in het bijzonder breedbanddiensten - te
kunnen aanbieden is van groot belang evenals de mogelijkheden voor aanbieders
om bijvoorbeeld one-stop-shopping  aan te bieden en/of technologie-26
onafhankelijke en gedifferentieerde vormen van diensten aan te kunnen bieden .27
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The conclusion here can be that OPTA does not appear to be very concerned about the negative
consequences of its decision on alternative infrastructure investment. In addition it can be
remarked that OPTA expresses scepticism about the possibility for infrastructure competition,
especially in point 88. It has done so in various other documents as well. However, also see the
speech af OPTA-chairman Arnbak at the cable congress where there seems a slight change in
thinking.(Also see the section on retail regulation).
88. Het aansluitnet van KPN is op dit moment zonder twijfel de belangrijkste vaste
telecommunicatie-infrastructuur. Dienstaanbieders zijn voor de afzet van hun
diensten geheel afhankelijk van dit net. In de toekomst verwacht het college wel
dat andere vaste telecommunicatienetten tot ontwikkeling zullen komen. Ook
zullen de mobiele en vaste telecommunicatienetten gaan convergeren. Op termijn
kan dit betekenen dat er meer ruimte wordt gelaten voor bepaalde elementen,
waaruit de tarieven voor diensten die zijn gebaseerd op originating access zijn
opgebouwd. Indien er voldoende concurrentie op de markt voor infrastructuur
zou komen, zou de markt in beginsel haar werk doen. Op dit moment doet, zoals
gezegd, die situatie zich echter niet voor. Het college verneemt graag de visie van
marktpartijen op deze gedachtengang.
OPTA took very long to make up its mind on MDF-access, only on March 12, 1999 did it publish
guidelines with respect to MDF-access and, hence, did it provide first answers to the following
important questions raised above:
 (i) Should the obligation to provide unbundled access be restricted to a certain time period,
like in Canada?
(ii) What will be the tariffs for such unbundled access? How much will it cost to rent the local
loop?
OPTA claims to have found an innovative solution to these questions that will indeed ensure that
competition can develop quickly, without deterring investments in alternative infrastructure. We
discuss these guidelines now.
Repeating the arguments given above for why MDF-access is important, the OPTA guidelines
state that a demand for MDF-access is reasonable if two conditions are satisfied:
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(i) such access is necessary for the demanding party to compete on the market, i.e. if the
access would be denied then the consumer could not be reached or accessing the
consumer would become uneconomical,
(ii) there is sufficient access capacity available, when it is assumed that this condition will be
satisfied for the first party demanding MDF-access.
We note that, while not using the term, the first requirement boils down to the local loop being
an essential facility, see also the definition given by the Canadian telecommunications regulator
in section 8. We also note that OPTA explicitly states that incumbent can refuse access if it can
show that alternatives exist. When the demand for MDF-access is reasonable, KPN has to provide
it against a quality that is at least equal to the quality that it provides for itself. The tariff for MDF-
access is cost based, where the innovative feature is that there will be a gradual shift from historic
cost accounting to current cost accounting, the idea being that this will stimulate service
competition in the short run, while maintaining the incentives for investment in alternative
infrastructure. Specifically, tariffs are determined according to the following formula
where
p  = price in year t (t = 1 in year 2000)t
p  = price based on historic cost, andt
h
p  = price based on current costt
c
These prices are based on the cost accounting models where a return on assets of 12.2% is
allowed. Hence, in the year 1999 (t =0), prices are fully based on the historic cost of the local
loop, just as in the cost model that is used for retail tariffs, in the year 2005, prices are exclusively
based on current cost as in the cost model for interconnection. There is thus a 5-year transition
period, after this period the prices will no longer be regulated, as OPTA announced.
The above formula will lead to prices that increases over time, hence, MDF-access will be
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available on more attractive conditions now than in the future. Consequently, the idea is that this
pricing formula will induce investment in alternative infrastructure. A question, however, is
whether OPTA’s commitment to the pricing formula is credible. If there happens to be no
investment in alternative infrastructure, then 5-years from now we will be in the same situation
as we are now, and if low access prices are a good idea now, they will be a good idea then.
Hence, if the market doubts OPTA’s credibility to stick to the formula, then the investment that
OPTA hopes for might not take place.
5.4 RETAIL PRICE REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS
Until July 1, 1997, telephony retail prices in the Netherlands are regulated through a price cap
regulatory mechanism: there are two baskets of services (of which one is relevant for residential
users) of which the prices are not allowed to increase by more than the rate of inflation. Note that
possible efficiency improvements are not incorporated, hence, the regulatory restriction is “light”
and, consequently, KPN makes a considerable profit on its telephony activities, there is a ROA
of about 20 %. With such a profit rate it cannot be argued that prices are cost oriented. On the
basis of the WACC-method, it might be argued that an ROA of 12.5% might be more appropriate.
The ONP voice telephony directive 95/62/EG insists on cost oriented retail tariffs. There has to
be an approved accounting system for the purpose and the NRA has to judge whether prices are
cost oriented. The ONP directive is implemented in Dutch law through a modification of the
“Bart” (besluit algemene richtlijnen telecommunicatie) from June 30, 1997. The “Bart” specifies
that KPN Telecom has to provide an accounting system for approval before 1 October 1997. As
several details about the accounting system and the regulatory system have not been specified,
OPTA decides to consult the market. It issues a consultation document on February 4, 1998. In
it, OPTA already expresses its preference for a price cap regulatory mechanism. It considers this
to be consistent with the ONP guidelines and will propose to the minister to implement it (see pt.
65). This would then be in line in the UK, where retail tariffs are regulated through a price cap
mechanism.
The ONP directives have bite in particular for those markets and services for which there is not
yet sufficient competition. The idea is that regulation can be a substitute for competition: for those
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markets and services for which competition has not developed yet, one insists on cost based tariffs
to protect consumers. As soon as there is sufficient competition, one can drop the requirement
of cost orientation. In February 1998, that only seems to be the case in market for international
calls. Note that cost oriented tariffs may imply both price ceilings (to protect consumers form
exploitation of monopoly power) as price floors (to protect entrants from anti competitive
behavior, such as predatory pricing, in markets where competition is developing). Hence, also
discount schemes and the like have to be judged.
In February 1998, KPN’s tariffs are still unbalanced: there is an access deficit which is subsidized
by traffic revenues. This situation is untenable when competition develops and EU directive
96/19/EC states that NRA’s have to allow incumbents to rebalance. At the time of the
consultation document there is still little competition in local and national markets, hence, there
is no acute need for KNP to rebalance. However, according to OPTA, the reason for the limited
competition is that competitors who want to use KPN’s network have to pay an Access Deficit
Contribution. OPTA is of the opinion that the ADC’s should be eliminated from interconnection
tariffs, hence, the cost of the local loop has to be fully covered by subscription fees. OPTA
instructs KPN to eliminate ADC’s and it allows KPN to rebalance.
In February 1998, KPN offers consumers a choice from a menu of three tariffs schedules
(belbasis, belbudget and belplus). In principle there is nothing wrong with a menu of schedules,
but they have to be judged according to their cost orientation. One should judge both whether the
price is not too high (consumer protection), nor too low (anti competitive behavior against
entrants). For the same reason, also discount schemes should be judged.
In the consultation document, OPTA announces that, for access and interconnection, it will allow
a lower rate of return than for traffic. The reason is that the risk in relation with “conveyance
services” is lower, after all there is less possibilities to substitute for these services. This holds, in
particular, for the local loop, which might be viewed as an essential facility. There is hardly any
alternatives for the local loop and OPTA does not expect the situation to change much in the near
future (see pt 67 of consultation document: OPTA expects service competition on KPN’s
network, but not infrastructure competition).
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A distinction has to be made between regular POTS and ISDN service. The latter may be viewed
as a higher quality variant. In February 1998, KPN allows consumers to switch from POTS to
ISDN without having to pay moving costs. The monthly subscription charge is higher for ISDN,
but also this charge  seems to be offered below cost. Two questions are now relevant:
1 should KPN be allowed to cross subsidize ISDN by POTS, i.e. should the entire
POTS/ISDN package be judged whether it is cost based,
2 should KPN be allowed to offer ISDN below cost?
Initially, OPTA argues against 1, but in favor of 2, the argument for the latter being that it is usual
business practice to introduce a new service below cost. Later (in its September statement) it
revises its opinion and argues that ISDN is not new anymore, it should be self supporting.
Consequently, the subscription fee should increase. OPTA considers such an increase also
reasonable because of the fact that at the time of rebalancing, the ISDN subsription rate remained
unchanged. (Recall that the subscription fee for POTS was increased by 25 %.)
After the consultation period, OPTA issues its statement about the cost orientation of KPN’s
tariffs on September 2, 1998. In the next paragraphs, we describe the most important aspects of
this statement. Let us, however, first summarize the reactions to the consultation. Generally
speaking, KPN argues for price flexibility and competitors argue for low wholesale prices and
high price floors for KPN’s retail price, giving them most room to compete. The consumer
organization wants low prices. OPTA sees its role as to balance these various interests. Of course,
this all is not very surprising. The most serious complaint issued against OPTA is by providers of
alternative infrastructure. They argue that OPTA does not seem to believe in infrastructure
competition in the local loop and that, therefore, it intends to regulate prices strictly. Such an
attitude may, according to the alternative access providers, indeed imply that competition will
never develop. OPTA has little to say against this argument other than that the rebalancing of
tariffs helps competitors.
Indeed, in the meantime (as of July 1, 1998) KPN has rebalanced its tariffs, this as a consequence
of the fact that KPN was no longer allowed to include the cost of the local loop in its
interconnection tariffs (OPTA decision from March 27, 1998).
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KPN offers three different POTS schedules: “belbasis” (taken by the majority of costumers),
“belbudget” (for light users) and “belplus” (for heavy users). All these retail schedules have a
common structure. First, a consumer has to pay to get connected to a network, or to get
connected at another place. Secondly, there is a monthly subscription fee. Thirdly, for each
successful call the consumer pays 10 cts. Finally, there are (per second) traffic related fees. These
differ according to the destination of the call: local, national or international. The latter market
is considered competitive and no regulation is considered necessary. For all calls, a distinction
between peak and off-peak is made. In addition to POTS, there is the (premium) ISDN service,
which involves a higher subscription fee. There is also special discounts for heavy users, but we
will not consider these. 
On the basis of the approved cost statement for 1997, OPTA has judged the cost orientation of
these various individual tariffs. The following table provides a global overview, in which all but
the last two rows refer to POTS-belbasis. OPTA asks KPN to make a price proposal that is in
agreement with this table within one month.
Service Price (guilders) Judgement Price Indication
Connection 231 (new) Too high Lower
66 (moving) Too high Lower
Subscription 34.6 Ok Ok
Call set up 0.1 Ok
Ok
Local traffic 0.06 (peak) Too high Reduce by 25 %
(minute)
0.03 (off-peak) Too high Reduce by 25 %
National traffic 0.145 (peak) Too high 25 % reduction in 3
(minute) years
0.0725 (off-peak) Too high
Fixed to mobile 0.9 Too high Reduce
0.53 Too high Reduce
ISDN connection 0 (migration) Too low Increase
ISDN subscription 49.95 Too low Increase by about
25%
One interesting aspect in the table is the fact that national calls are treated differently from local
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calls. The arguments are given on pages 57-59 of the Statement document. A drastic decrease in
the national rates could kill emerging competition in this market, as it would reduce the margins
between interconnection rates and retail prices. This is an argument in favor of gradual reduction.
In contrast, OPTA argues that in the local market there is no emerging competition, hence,
interests of consumers should prevail. Therefore, prices can be reduced at once. Hence, the
overall picture is clear: no regulation where there is already sufficient competition, light regulation
(and a transition path) where competition is developing, and strict regulation where no
competition is expected.
As said, to judge the cost orientation of prices, OPTA has based itself on the cost figures for
1997. The prices, however, will hold in 1999 and the cost in 1999 may very well be different.
OPTA had indicated that it was willing to reconsider if there were drastic changes and, indeed,
KPN argues that there are such major changes. Concerning the costs, preliminary estimates for
1998 indicate that these are much higher than in 1997 because of network investment and because
of reorganization. KPN thus demands a smaller decrease in POTS-prices. Secondly, the number
of ISDN subscribers has grown considerably, with the consequence that the ISDN service is now
almost breaking even. KPN thus asks for lower ISDN-prices. In sum, KPN asks for a price
proposal on the basis of the newly estimated 1998 data and it argues that such a proposal will lead
to almost unchanged traffic and ISDN prices. OPTA argues that it is not unreasonable to
incorporate changing circumstances and that it would be undesirable if retail prices would
fluctuate like a jo-jo. Insisting on the original proposals would indeed have this effect. Hence,
OPTA is willing to reconsider its earlier decision and it organizes a hearing to discuss this opinion
with market parties.
During the consultation, the asymmetric treatment of national and local rates is discussed. OPTA
now seems to provide an opening, as it will investigate investments in alternative local
infrastructure. If such investments are taking place and if drastic reduction of local retail prices
could kill such investments, OPTA indicates that it is willing to reconsider its decision concerning
the local market as well.
Concerning OPTA’s demands for lower prices, KPN agrees to reduce the connection fee to ƒ 100
(from 231) and the migration fee to ƒ 25 (from 66) and it proposes to reduce the national traffic
28 Very recently, on April 20, OPTA published its consultation document on price caps. OPTA
proposes a global price cap, a one time reduction to oriented tariffs at the start and a three year
period. An alternative is to choose higher prices at the start and a higher value of X (faster
decrease); in that case, however, OPTA would want to impose subcaps on certain services. The
final decision will also depend on the investigations of developments in local loop competition
which is taking place at present and of which the results are expected in June.
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tariffs by some 10 %. OPTA accepts these proposals, in the latter case since this amounts to a first
step in an overall 3 year reduction plan. KPN also proposes to reduce the fixed to mobile tariffs
by some 5 %. OPTA agrees but expects KPN to reduce these prices further in the future when
competition in the mobile market has developed further and interconnection prices in the mobile
market will have come down.
KPN proposes to leave the prices for local calls unchanged, although it is willing to offer a special
low Sunday rate of 2 cts/minute. Taking into account the higher cost estimates for 1998, the
return on the subscription fee is below the allowed rate, hence, if these costs are accepted, KPN
could increase the subscription fee. Rather than doing this, KPN prefers to keep the lower
subscription fee and to subsidize the “deficit” by somewhat higher local rates. As alternative
providers of local infrastructure have indicated that they would prefer to compete with lower
traffic related prices, OPTA decides to agree to KPN’s proposal. Of course, one should not
expect KPN to help competitors, the conclusion must be that KPN is not hurt very much by the
competition yet.
As far as ISDN prices are concerned, KPN agrees to increase the price of the upgrade (migrating
from POTS to ISDN) to ƒ 225, but it proposes to leave the subscription fee unchanged. OPTA
agrees with both proposals even if both prices are insufficient to cover the cost. The argument is
that, now that the number of ISDN subscribers has increased considerably, these prices will not
be loss making in the near future.
The new prices will become effective on January 1, 1999. There will be a possible revision as of
July 1, 1999. Also, a price cap system will be developed. It will be interesting to see whether
OPTA will choose for regulation of individual prices or for more global regulation of price
baskets. According to economic theory, the latter is more desirable.28
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6. TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE UK
The UK telephony market has seen competition since the early 1980's. In 1983, the government
announced its “duopoly policy” which was that, besides BT, only Mercury would be licensed as
fixed network operator until 1990. The idea underlying this policy was that, by being protected
from further entry, Mercury was given incentives to develop as a strong competitor to BT. To
further help Mercury, regulation was asymmetric in the sense that BT was subject to more specific
regulatory constraints. However, the effect was that Mercury competed only in the highly
profitable international and business markets and that most residential consumers did not benefit
much from the competition. When the “duopoly policy” was ended in 1991, the government fully
opened all markets and since then many newcomers have entered, also in the local markets. In
particular, cable companies have made significant inroads in the local telephony market as about
25 % of those consumers who could use cable for telephony actually do so. 
Since the “duopoly policy” expired, the UK regulatory regime can be characterized by a focus on
infrastructure competition and by asymmetry, in the sense that more strict obligations are imposed
on BT. The idea is that consumer interests are served best by having competition at all levels of
the value chain, and that, to have effective competition on all levels, entrants should be given
incentives to invest and the incumbent operator should be prevented from exerting market power.
To give entrants incentives to invest, access to be BT’s network has not been too easy. In a sense,
the policy has had the effect of sacrificing short-term benefits in the hope of realizing higher
benefits from vigorous infrastructure competition in the future.
To prevent BT from exerting market power, it has had to comply with strict obligations. In this
sense, regulation has been strictly asymmetric. For example, BT faces line of business restrictions:
it is not allowed to provide TV-services, although it can offer video on demand. As cable
operators do not face a line of business restriction, this asymmetric regulation clearly is in their
favour. Secondly, BT (and Mercury) face technology restrictions: it is prohibited from using fixed
wireless technology, other than in sparely populated areas, where competition is not likely to
materialize in any case. Thirdly, BT is not permitted to de-average prices; under its license it must
have national prices and a published national traffic. As there is no such obligation on competing
operators, this policy clearly invites entry in the low cost areas.
29OFTEL’s policy on indirect access, equal access and direct connection to the access network:
statement from the director general of telecommunications, 1996, paragraph 46
30 OFTEL: Pricing of telecommunications services from 1997: a consultative document.
Available at www.oftel.gov.uk.
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In the next subsections, we describe the policy on interconnection, and special access and the
regulation of the retail market in some greater detail. Asymmetry and stimulation of infrastructure
investments will be recurring elements. Subsection 6.1 describes the regulator’s aims and explains
why these elements are recurring.
6.1 INFRASTRUCTURE COMPETITION OR SERVICE COMPETITION?
Since the ending of the duopoly period, the British telecommunications policy has been based on
the idea that competition at all network levels will best serve the consumers= interest. For
example, the telecommunications regulator OFTEL has clearly stated that:
“The UK’s aim is that all costumers should have the choice of at least three
operators. These might comprise BT, a cable operator, a radio access operator
and/or an indirect access operator”.29
This policy is also based on the idea that pure service competition will not bring enough benefits
to most residential consumers. For example, in another of OFTEL’s consultation document, we
read
“Oftel considers that greater competition in the international and national markets
will have little impact for most residential customers, since they generally take all
their calls as a combined package of local/national/international calls from their
local access provider ..... Residential customers will, therefore, in most cases only
be able to take advantage of greater competition in national and international calls
when they have effective competition amongst alternative local access
providers”.30
The document describing OFTEL’s policy on access that was referred to above suggests that this
31 Paragraph 27 of “OFTEL’s policy on indirect access”
32 See OFTEL’s statement from beginning 1997 with that title that summarizes the situation.
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policy has been successful. 
“The development of competing telecommunications infrastructure in recent years
suggests that by encouraging local competition, the UK is creating one of the most
competitive markets for telecom in the world and is spreading competitive benefits
to a wider cross-section of the community than has been achieved in other
jurisdictions. The policy of encouraging competing infrastructure is now being
followed or considered by many other countries.”31
Of course, within the UK, it has been realized that it takes time before competition based on
infrastructure is sufficiently developed. In the meantime one might rely on service competition
over the existing monopolistic network. Clearly, the service providers, need access to that
network, hence, an obligation to provide indirect access has been imposed on the dominant
operator BT and is included in the condition of its licence. The question now is how easy such
access should be in order to reap the benefits of competition. More generally, the OFTEL
documents on “Promoting Competition in Services over Telecommunications Networks”  deal32
with the question of how to create the right balance between infrastructure competition and
service competition, how to encourage more effective service competition, while at the same time
not undermining network competition? These consultation documents generally deal with two
issues: (i) concern for BT’s market power and (ii) EU-developments (such as the Interconnection
Directive) which might necessitate changes in the UK-policy. 
It is useful to distinguish various markets and various players on these markets. There is the
(wholesale) market for network services, the market for basic retail services (such as plain
telephony) and the market for enhanced services. There are two types of players: network
operators (service providers with their own network) and independent service providers (those
without a network). BT is a dominant player that is active on all markets. BT is dominant in the
market for network services (it has 94 % of all residential lines) and dominant in the retail market
(it has a 94 % share in the local market and 70 % share in the international one). It is generally
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agreed that to prevent BT from abusing its dominant position a clear accounting separation of the
various activities is necessary; OFTEL believes that structural separation would, however, be
inefficient. There is regulation on the market for network services and the market for basic retail
services, while the enhanced service market is unregulated. In this market, there is convergence
between various types of services.
In the market for network services, different players are treated differently. The network
operators have RCS-status and are eligible for, standard cost, based interconnection terms from
BT, which are set by the regulator. The ISP’s have to negotiate with BT concerning terms of
access and interconnection. The obvious question thus is whether ISP’s should be charged the
same as network operators. OFTEL argues not since this would undermine the investment
incentives for network owners. On the other hand, ISP’s should be charged less than retail
consumers, since they use fewer network services than final consumers do: they should not pay
for elements of service that they do not use. Hence, the Spring 1997 statement concludes with (i)
a demand for clearer separation of the various BT-services, (ii) cost oriented interconnection
tariffs for network operators and (iii) interconnection charges based on “retail minus cost savings”
for ISP-operators.
6.2 INTERCONNNECTION
The European Interconnection Directive (97/33/EC) forced the UK to change its interconnection
policy. In this subsection we briefly describe the UK interconnection policy before the
implementation of the ICD and why this had to change because of the ICD.
Before 1998, in the UK rights and obligations to interconnect were granted by way of a license.
The regulation was asymmetric in the sense that initially only BT was obliged to provide
interconnection, the idea being that other operators, not having market power, would choose to
provide interconnection voluntarily. Later on, the obligation to interconnect was extended to
other operators, but another important distinction remained, viz. that between operators having
so called RCS-status and those without that status. RCS-status entitled the holder to cost based
interconnection charges from BT. (As of October 1997, these costs are calculated on the basis
of long and incremental cost). In principle, whether or not an operator had this favorable RCS-
 See OFTEL consultation document “Rights and Obligations to interconnect under EU33
interconnection directive”, 198, paragraph 18
34 See also the most recent statement of the DGT ”Rights and obligations to interconnect under
the EC interconnection directive”, April 1999, in particular 2.3, 2.16 and 2.17.
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status depended on whether or not it intended to invest in infrastructure. Hence, the carrot of
being able to obtain favorable interconnection rates from BT served as an incentive to build
competing infrastructure. Hence, also here there is an asymmetry as the interconnection terms
depend on the identity of the party requesting interconnection and not just on the service
provided.
The basic principle underlying the ICD is that all operators who have bottleneck control of access
to costumers should interconnect with one another to ensure universality of services and
interoperability of networks. The ICD framework is reciprocal: those who have obligations also
have rights. In addition, there are operators with SMP (significant market power) who are forced
to interconnect at cost oriented tariffs. The interconnection rates of these operators have to be
non-discriminatory, objective and transparent.
The ICD directive forces the UK to change its policy. The UK policy was based on the idea of
stimulating competition between infrastructures. Those operators taking on the obligation to build
infrastructure received RCS status, which granted the right to obtain interconnection from BT at
cost oriented tariffs. However, as the formal requirement of “making a significant contribution to
infrastructure” is difficult to make objective, this requirement is incompatible with the ICD.
The consequence of the EU-induced change is that more operators will get the right to
interconnect with BT at favorable terms. A question is whether the new policy will remove the
incentive to build alternative infrastructure? OFTEL  argues no, but the argument is not worked33
out in detail.  What is clear is the “policy competition” argument that is given. If the UK would34
maintain its policy (assuming it could) and would insist on building requirements, then operators
could register in a different EU country and obtain the right to interconnect with BT at cost based
terms in that way, hence, the policy would not be effective.
OFTEL has determined that BT is an operator with SMP and that it thus has to offer cost oriented
interconnection rates. The methodology for calculating these rates is set out in condition 13 of
35 A recent OFTEL consultation document (February 1999) concludes that indirect access should
also be obligatory for 2 mobile networks (Vodaphone and Cellnet) and that the relevant price is
retail price minus savings.
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BT’s license. We refer to the OFTEL documents “network charges from 1997" for further details,
but provide a very brief summary here. The current contract period runs from 1 October 1997 to
30 September 2001. At the start, the rates were determined by means of long run incremental
costs, allowing for a ROA of 12.5%. For non-competitive services, the controls evolve according
to a price cap mechanism, p  = (RPI - X) p  where X depends on the extent of competition: forth t
prospectively competitive services X = 0, so that these charges may not rise in real terms; for
bottlenecks and non-competitive services, there are three baskets of interconnection services (one
for general network elements, another for call termination services), a third for connection
services), for each of these X is around 10%.
6.3 SPECIAL ACCESS
In this subsection, we summarize the important OFTEL document “OFTEL’s policy on indirect
access, equal access and direct connection to the access network: statement form the director
general of telecommunications” (1996). The document argued that the cost of carrier pre-
selection exceed the benefits, hence, that the requirement should not be imposed. Also in this case,
the UK was forced to change policy because of EU developments: carrier pre-selection has to be
offered by January 1, 2000. At the end of the subsection, we move to the recent (December 1998)
consultation document “Access to Bandwidth” in which OFTEL outlines its policy with respect
to the EU proposals on local loop unbundling.
Indirect Access refers to the situation where a costumer contracts a telecommunications service
from an operator to which he is not directly connected. All public fixed network operators  in the35
UK have the obligation to provide indirect access (interconnection) to all operators holding RCS-
status. (All main network operators in the UK as well as some service providers have RCS-
status). In addition, the Director General of OFTEL can impose on BT to offer equal access, but
only after having conducted a cost/benefit analysis. Here, equal access refers to dialing parity, i.e.
it should be just as easy to route calls via operator X than via BT, for example, in both cases
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should a 4-digit code be called first. We note that in the UK, about 3.5% of the residential
consumers use indirect access and 13% in the business market. One question is whether BT
should offer such equal access. Related is the question of whether also other network operators
should be forced to offer equal access, i.e. should the requirements be symmetric or asymmetric?
Thirdly, there is the question whether competing operators should have the possibility of direct
access to the costumer, i.e. that they be able to lease the line from BT.
In 1996, the consulting firm NERA performed a cost benefit study on various forms of indirect
access. One of the options investigated was carrier pre-selection with an override feature to select
a different operator on a call by call basis. According to the computations, this results in direct
benefits (more service and easier use) which are estimated at around, £ 20m over a 10 year period.
In addition there are indirect benefits, these resulting from stronger competitive pressure on
existing operators. These benefits are estimated to be in the order of magnitude of £ 60m over a
10 year period. The latter figure is contested, however. In addition, there are costs of introducing
these options, estimated by NERA around £ 160m. The conclusion is that costs exceed benefits,
a conclusion that also holds for the other options. (The option “call by call carrier selection” is
estimated to have almost zero benefits and to have costs around £ 47m). Besides there is an
additional important argument against equal access that has not been taken into account in the
cost/benefit analysis: its introduction might discourage operators from developing alternative
networks. OFTEL phrases it as follows (in point 23):
The NERA study raised doubts about the overall economic benefit of introducing
equal access. In addition, OFTEL is concerned that its introduction could
discourage operators form developing alternative access networks if they risked
the benefits of their investments to competing operators. OFTEL concluded, on
balance, that there is no case for directing BT to provide equal access.
OFTEL thus concluded that forcing BT to offer equal access would be against the public interest.
Similarly, OFTEL concludes that it is undesirable to force alternative operators to offer equal
access. In fact they should not even be obliged to offer indirect access, for, as long as the indirect
access requirement is imposed on BT, costumers will have access to any service provider through
the BT network. OFTEL’s general concern here is that imposing the obligation to offer indirect
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access on alternative network operators might expose these operators to cherry picking by
indirect access operators, hence, that it might again discourage the development of competing
infrastructure, which clearly is undesirable. OFTEL phrases this as follows:
28. A particular concern of OFTEL, therefore, is that companies entering the
market, investing substantially in infrastructure and providing alternative direct
connections to the trunk networks for customers, should not be exposed to
cherry-picking by indirect access operators. Although there are pricing structures
that new entrants could adopt to mitigate this problem, these pricing structures
may result in reduced potential consumer welfare and slow down the provision of
competing infrastructure. In addition, OFTEL’s view is that, when applied to new
networks, indirect access is likely to exploit the high initial costs experienced by
such networks and discourage the development of competing infrastructure.
Therefore, when considering the question of whether non-dominant operators
should be required to provide indirect access, it remains of the view that this is
generally undesirable.
The proposed revision of the Interconnection Directive, however, forces the UK to revise its
policy on indirect access now: the revised ICD requires that carrier pre-selection (CPS) be offered
by SMP operators as of January 1, 2000. In a consultation document from July 1998, OFTEL has
announced that CPS will be available from the SMP-operators (BT and Kingston in the Hull area)
as early as possible. However, since completely new software is needed for the purpose, the UK
will not be able to make the January 1, 2000 deadline and the UK will seek a deferral. All Annex
II operators will be eligible for CPS and the relevant switches will have an initial capacity to host
up to 100 operators, the capacity being allocated on a first come first serve basis.
Those UK consumers who wish to make use of CPS, can make a choice from the following menu,
where choosing options implies that one cannot choose for any of the other options:
Option 1: CPS for international calls only
Option 2: CPS for national calls only
Option 3: CPS for all calls, i.e. local, national, international, fixed to mobile and specially tariffed.
Hence, a consumer could choose to have CPS for international calls with an operator X and CPS
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for national calls with another operator Y, or to have CPS for all calls with an operator Z. In each
case, it will be possible to have a call carried by another operator by dialing a short access code.
Clearly, the introduction of CPS may worsen the competitive situation of alternative direct access
providers. How much these are harmed will depend on how the CPS costs are recovered, the
details of this cost recovery still have to be worked out.
The third issue discussed in the 1996 Statement is direct access to the consumer. OFTEL is pretty
clear on its undesirability in paragraph 45 of the statement:
“Although OFTEL recognizes that direct connection to the Access Network is
feasible, it would run counter to the UK policy of encouraging alternative
infrastructure. It would involve the leasing of part of BT's network at a regulated
price to its competitors and hence would discourage rather than encourage
operators to build their own Access Networks. It would undermine the value of
the investment of other operators, particularly cable companies, have made in
building their own infrastructure to gain costumers and hinder the development
and upgrading of existing Access Networks.”
Furthermore, paragraph 46 states:
“UK operators are likely to have invested £ 7.5 billion in building alternative
Access Networks to BT by the end of 1996 and considerable further investment
is planned. Any move to allow operators to take over BT exchange lines would
undermine post investments and jeopardize future plans.”
OFTEL concludes, therefore, that direct connection to the BT Access Network would adversely
effect the development of competition and would not be in the interests of the UK consumer.
In its 1996 statement, OFTEL remarked that its position concerning the direct access issue could
change over time with market developments, for changing circumstances might imply that the
balance of economic benefits might change. In relation to the EU discussion on convergence,
36 OFTEL consultation document “Access to bandwidth: bringing higher bandwidth services to
the consumer”, December 1998
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OFTEL has recently returned to the question of whether direct access (i.e. local loop unbundling)
could be desirable now. A recent consultation document  notes that, at present, there is effective36
demand for higher bandwidth services such as fast Internet access and video on demand and that
these services could be delivered to the consumer through various channels (cable-tv or telephony
networks), but that the both of these need to be upgraded for the purpose. The document argues
that, for the moment, copper loops, enhanced by application of xDSL-technologies appear to be
the best means of wide and early access to higher bandwidth. Hence, the growing demand for the
higher bandwidth services increases the importance of the local loop and the question thus is
whether regulatory action is necessary. The document considers 5 options for such regulatory
action:
i) Unbundled local loop. BT would be required to lease its local loop and to offer collocation for
a competitor’s broadband equipment.
ii) Partial baseband leased circuit. For the consumer this is similar to option 1, the difference,
however, is that the entrant leases the modems as well.
iii) Bitstream access. BT operators the modems and a competitor leases the line and the modems.
iv) Permanent virtual circuit access. For the consumer this is like 3.
v) Indirect access. The higher bandwidth line is connected to the service provider, this would
work very similar to current small band indirect access. Also carrier selection would be possible.
The document asks about the effects on competition and on the incentives to invest of each of
these options, but it does not provide much details. More will be known later this spring.
6.4 THE RETAIL MARKET
Retail price control is limited to that market segment, low and medium use residential costumers
and low use small businesses, for which there is not yet effective competition. The current control
is in place since 1997 and lasts till 2001. A basket has been established on the basis of telephony
use of the first 80% (by spend) of residential costumers (rental: 49%; calls: 51%, of which local:
29%, national: 15%, international: 3%, other: 4%) and the price of this basket cannot increase by
more than RPI - 4.5%. Besides this overall cap, there are no separate caps on individual prices,
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with the RPI + 2% on line rental (which prevented BT from rebalancing quickly) having been
lifted in 1996.
Interestingly, competitors are allowed to price discriminate in the local market: cable companies
offer free local calls to other subscribers on the cable network.
BT has been forced to offer number probability as of July 1996. Other operators are not obliged
to do so, but they may voluntarily. Some of them did, for example, IONICA offered a discount
to consumers who choose number portability.
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7. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE US
In this section we focus attention on the US Telecommunications Act of 1996. We limit ourselves
to the wholesale market. The discussion that follows is based on 
N. Economides “The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Impact”, forthcoming
Japan and the world economy
B. Mitchel and I. Vogelsang: “Telecommunications Competition: The last 10 miles”, book
1998
I. Vogelsang and G. Woroch: “Local telephone service: a complex dance of technology,
regulation and competition” forthcoming in L. Duetsch and M. Sharpe “Industry Studies”
R.G. Harris and C.J. Kraft “Meddling through: regulating local telephone competition in
the United States”, J. Econ. Perspectives 11 4 (1997) 93-113
J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole: "Competition in telecommunications", book manuscript, march
1998
Economides remarks that “more than two years after the passage of the Act, there is very little
entry and competition in the local market”. The question to be addressed is how to explain this.
Deregulation of the US telecommunications sector started with the breakup of AT&T in 1984.
Seven Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOC’s) where divested from AT&T and  were
given exclusive regional territories (local access and transport areas, LATA’s) in which they were
allowed to carry calls. At the same time a line of business restriction was imposed on these
RBOC's: they were forbidden to carry Inter-LATA calls. These long-distance calls were handled
by long distance companies, such as AT&T, MCI or Spirit. A clause, however, stipulated that the
line of business restriction could be lifted if an RBOC could show that "there is no substantial
possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it seeks to
enter". The direct  effect of the breakup was the development of competition in the long distance
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market. This was also stimulated by active pro-competitive policy of the federal telecoms
regulator, the FCC (for example, by allowing resellers to exploit arbitrage possibilities).
Competition in the local markets developed slower, in part because of regulatory barriers. In order
to maintain universal service, policy makers typically insisted on geographically averaged prices
and cross subsidies where access charge was below cost. Obviously, such a system can be
maintained only if entry is limited. Over the last decade, however, competitive access providers
(CAP's) have entered the profitable (business) districts of the local market, thus upsetting the
traditional system, hence, the need to revise the law.
The main objectives of the new act are to further open telecommunications markets to
competition and to protect competition against the market power of incumbent dominant carriers.
The act envisions a network of interconnected networks and uses both structural and behavioral
instruments to reach these goals. It outlaws artificial barriers to entry in local markets, and it
mandates interconnection and unbundling of network elements so that competitors can enter
easily. At the same time, the act aims to preserve universal service, however, the traditional
subsidy mechanisms are to be replaced by competitively neutral ones. Harris and Kraft describe
the act as a series of grand compromises among the three major classes of telecommunications
providers: ILEC’s, long distance operators and cable companies. The long distance companies
were concerned that the RBOC’s could leverage their (local) monopoly power to these other
markets, hence, they (successfully) lobbied to prevent entry of RBOC’s before the local markets
had been opened. The act contains a long list of requirements that have to be met before ILEC’s
are allowed to enter into long distance markets. (It should be noted that concerns for leverage of
market power are indeed justified). A second compromise allows cable companies to be freed
from price regulation in their “home” market once they face effective competition in that market,
for example from ILEC’s.
The act views the local loop as a bottleneck controlled by the local incumbent. Its key focus is to
introduce competition in this last bottleneck while preserving the effective competition that has
developed in the long distance market. Until competition has developed sufficiently , regulation
attempts to simulate competition. Entry in the local market is more difficult than in the long
distance market because of high capital requirements, the need to cooperate with the incumbent
and the existence of location specific constraints. The act envisions three types of entry in the
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local market: facilities based entry, service resale entry and unbundled entry. The first involves
constructing competing infrastructure, the second involves buying ILEC services at discounted
rates (basically according to prices that are based on the efficient component pricing rule, ie
opportunity costs are reimbursed) and the third is a hybrid of the two former two: the entrant
leases local network elements from the incumbent (at cost based prices) and combines these with
his own network elements. To facilitate entry in the local market, the act imposes mandatory
interconnection and unbundling on incumbents and it imposes number portability on all parties.
Interconnection has to be offered at any technically feasible point (including the line side of the
local switch) on non-discriminatory, reasonable terms. To implement interconnection and
unbundling, an incumbent is required to allow for physical collocation of the competitor’s
equipment. 
The level of unbundling is important and has been contested: incumbents have argued that the
level required by the act is excessive, while entrants have been concerned that incumbents force
them to buy excessively bundled elements. The FCC's "Report and Order" from August 1996
identifies seven network elements that have to be unbundled: local loops, network interface
devices, local and tandem switches ( including all software features), interoffice transmission
facilities, signaling and call related database facilities, operations support systems and operator
and directory assistance facilities services. One notes that not all of these constitute essential
facilities! The FCC reasoned that the bottleneck characteristic is unimportant as facilities based
entrants would want to lease the other elements as well.
In an evaluation, Harris and Kraft conclude that the act and the FCC’s interpretation of it involve
too extensive unbundling requirements. As they write:
“The act’s requirements that incumbent’s networks be unbundled at all technology
feasible points is excessive and not economically justifiable. According to
established antitrust law and economics, the only valid reason for requiring
unbundling is if a good or service is an “essential” facility, that is, it is control and
necessary to the production process in a downstream market (meaning that
without access to the facility, production is impossible), it is a monopoly or
bottleneck, and it is not economically replicable by competitors. ....[The authors
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continue that call termination is such an essential facility and that according to
some analysts, but not to them, the local loop is as well]....However, the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 went much further, requiring incumbents to
unbundled assets which are clearly not essential in the sense defined here, such as
end office and tandem switching, local transport, operator service and directory
assistance”.
The 1996 act requires the prices for interconnection and unbundled elements to be cost based and
nondiscriminatory, but they may include a reasonable rate of profit. In its first report and order
(August 1996) the FCC has concluded that the relevant cost standard is “total element long run
incremental cost” (TELRIC) and that an 11.25 % rate for the cost of capital is appropriate. Note
that TELRIC is an economic cost concept, it is the sum of all minimized cost paid for all inputs
required to supply the element of the network in question. The concept is forward looking (focus
is on technological possibilities available today rather than on embedded costs), it is long run
(costs are estimated assuming that all of the firms costs are available) and it is incremental (one
looks at the additional cost to provide the elements. Because of this latter aspect, common costs
are not included, in TELRIC, however, a reasonable allocation of forward looking common costs
may be included in the prices for interconnection and network elements. In the meantime, courts
have ruled that the FCC has overstepped its authority by insisting on the TELRIC cost standard.
Furthermore, apparently TELRIC did not give unambiguous answers, incumbents’ TELRIC
models resulted in high prices while TELRIC models of entrants yield low prices.
Note that, by insisting that prices be cost based, the FCC explicitly rejects opportunity costs
concepts such as the “efficient component pricing rule”. According to the latter concept,
advocated by Baumol and his colleagues, the price would be equal to the cost of the input plus
the profit foregone when the competitor provides the service. The FCC asserts that opportunity
cost pricing will discourage competition and will provide no mechanism for forcing retail prices
to their competitive level. (See FRAO 709-710). Note, however, that resellers have to pay ECPR-
related cost.
The FCC discusses the relations between pricing and investment incentives for entrants in the
paragraphs 683-685 of the FRAO. It argues that prices that are based on most efficient network
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technology (i.e. prices that would prevail in a highly competitive market place) are lower and
could thus discourage competition from facilities based entrants (683). Prices based on existing
network design and technology, on the other hand, are higher and could perhaps give facilities
based entrants the greatest incentive to invest (684).
In their evaluation of pricing issues, Harris and Kraft conclude that some TELRIC models fail to
mimic the actual functioning of competitive markets and produce prices that are too low. They
write:
“If state regulators base prices for unbundled network elements on models which
estimate uneconomically low costs, new entrants’ “build or buy” decisions will be
distorted and the construction of economically efficient competing network
facilities will be deterred. Instead, new entrants will rely on reselling the network
elements of the incumbents. Thus, to promote efficient, facilities based
competition, prices should be based on realistic cost estimates and take account
of the costs actually incurred in providing service”.
As they also remark, the problems are exacerbated by the fact that local regulators maintain
subsidies to provide universal service, the consequence being that, while wholesale lease prices
are below costs, incumbents are forced to sell at the retail level with non cost based markups. The
overall conclusion that Haris and Kraft draw is:
“The extreme unbundling requirements in the Telecommunications Act, combined
with the FCC’s rules, promote resale of incumbents’ services and network
elements at the expense of delaying or deterring facilities-based entry... To the
extent that prices for these wholesale services and unbundled network elements
are set at uneconomically low rates by state arbitrators and public utility
commissions, resale becomes an even more favorable method for entry. In this
way, policymakers have biased the “build or buy” decisions of potential entrants,
potentially deterring technically efficient construction of facilities and delaying the
development of facilities-based competition .... As mentioned earlier, we believe
the failure of cable companies to enter the local telephony market on a widespread
37 R. Harris and C.J. Kraft: Meddling through: Regulating Local Telephone Competition in the
United States”. J. Econ. Perspectives 11, 4, (1997) 93-113
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basis is due in large part to the FCC’s local competition and interconnection rules,
the low cost estimates for leasing incumbents’ local network being set by state
regulators and the uncertainty surrounding the whole regulatory process due to
legal challenges”.37
Despite of all that has been said, there also has been little “leasing based entry”, this because of
the fact that incumbents have argued that the fixed cost associated with unbundling are high, thus
imposing high costs on entrants. If migration of consumers is (expected to be) high, then such
on/off costs can create a significant barrier.
The overall conclusion is that up to now there has been minimal entry of new competitors in the
local market, either through leasing of unbundled network elements, or through resale, or through
building of new facilities. The local market is still far form competitive.
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8. TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN CANADA
In this section, we briefly contrast the US to Canada. Again, we focus on the wholesale market.
An important difference between local competition in Canada and in the US is that the Canadian
approach favors facilities based competition. Below we quote extensively from the CRTC
Telecom Decision 97-8 (May 1, 1997) on “Local competition” that makes this clear. For example,
the opening paragraph (237) of that part of the decision dealing with resale states:
“The commission is of the view that resale can promote the development of a
competitive market while allowing competitors time to construct their own
facilities. While resale competition can help the development of a competitive
market, it is the commission’s view that the full benefits of competition can only
be realized with facilities based competition.”
Sprint Canada, in particular, had advocated resale of unbundled facilities and resale of retail
services, the latter on the basis of wholesale tariffs that equal retail tariffs less available cost.
Concerning the former, CRTC agrees and it concludes that ILEC’s must allow for the unrestricted
resale of unbundled components, other than subscriber listings (240). The demand for local call
resale, however, is rejected by the CTRC: “the commission finds that it would not be appropriate
to require ILEC’s to file tariff rates as proposed by Sprint” (250). The commission bases this
conclusion on two arguments. First it argues that the net cost reductions resulting from the
provision of wholesale services would be small (so that there would be little room for resellers to
compete) and, secondly, to implement the system, extensive regulatory involvement would be
needed.
Before turning to local loop unbundling, let us briefly consider interconnection and retail price
regulation. To ensure interoperability of networks, the CTRC orders all LEC’s to provide
interconnection with all other LEC’s. The commission is of the view that the interchange of traffic
between LEC’s should take place at a single point of interconnection that is distinguished as a
gateway. The gateway could be the local switch or the number switch. The interconnection
charges are based on cost and include a mark-up for common costs. Interconnection for local
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traffic is on a bill-and-keep arrangement where traffic volumes are balanced. New entrants are
obliged to offer interconnection and to have to satisfy a certain number of other conditions,
however, it is considered that they do not control essential facilities and they do not face
restrictions on their retail tariffs.
Let us now return to the issue of local loop unbundling. As stated above, CRTC has mandated
unbundling of certain of ILEC’s service and facility components that competitors will need in
order to compete. The basic idea is that ILEC’s are required to unbundle essential facilities but
nothing more as this will be the best stimulus for competition. In this respect, the May 1997
decision reverses the earlier decision 94-19 (September 16, 1994) which had concluded that
unbundling should extend beyond monopoly controlled bottlenecks to services that are subject
to dominant supply by the telephone companies. As the commission states in the crucial
paragraphs 73 and 74 of decision 97-8:
73.The Commission considers that either too narrow or too broad a definition of
an essential facility may impair the development of competition.  If it is too
narrow, competitors may not be able to enter the market because of an inability
to obtain the necessary network components.  If it is too broad, giving overly
generous access to ILEC inputs, CLEC’s may not have sufficient incentives to
invest in their own facilities, and would enter and remain in the market primarily
as resellers.  The Commission is of the view that efficient and effective
competition will be best achieved through facilities-based competitive service
providers; otherwise, competition will only develop at the retail level, with the
ILECs retaining monopoly control of wholesale level distribution.
74.In light of the above, the Commission concludes that ILEC’s should generally
not be required to make available facilities for which there are alternative sources
of supply or which CLEC’s can reasonably supply on their own.  Accordingly, the
Commission considers it inappropriate to define an essential facility as a facility
that is provided by a dominant firm with market power because it would require
facilities to be treated as essential even in the face of the demonstrated feasibility
of alternative provision, including self-supply.  The Commission concludes that to
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be essential, a facility, function, or service must meet all three of the following
criteria:  (1) it is monopoly controlled; (2) a CLEC requires it as an input to
provide services; and (3) a CLEC cannot duplicate it economically or technically.
Facilities that meet this definition shall be subject to mandatory unbundling and
mandated pricing.  As well, the tariffed rates for these facilities shall be treated as
costs in the imputation test.
In any case, the commission concludes that local switching, transiting of traffic, the CCS7
signaling network, directory assistance and message relay service do not meet the requirements
of essential facilities. On the other hand central office codes, subscriber listings and local loops
in certain regions (in particular, small urban and rural areas) should be considered as essential
facilities. In other regions, there is already some competitive supply of local loops, so that in these
cases the above 3 conditions for an essential facility are not satisfied. However, as such
competition is still very limited,  the commission concludes that, for a period of 5 years, the local
loops in these regions should be unbundled according to the principles established for essential
facilities, this in order to allow entrants to compete effectively in these regions in the short-run.
After this 5 year period, however, these facilities will no be subject to mandatory unbundling or
essential facilities rating. As the commission writes:
85.The Commission notes that, in the other bands, there is competitive supply but
it is very limited.  In the Commission's view, CLEC’s would not be able to provide
a significant number of loops in these bands in the early stages of competition.
The Commission therefore concludes that CLEC’s must have access to ILEC
loops in these bands if they are to compete effectively in the short term.
Accordingly, the Commission considers that, while local loops in these bands do
not meet the criteria for essential facilities, they should nevertheless be unbundled
and priced based on the rating principles for essential facilities.  However, as these
loops are not essential in accordance with the Commission's definition, ILEC’s
will only be required to cost these loops at Phase II levels rather than at tariffed
rates in the imputation test.  In Part V below, the Commission has directed the
ILEC’s to file revised demand estimates based on all companies' demand together
with cost studies and rates for such local loops.
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86.The Commission considers it appropriate to apply this modified treatment to
local loops in the lower cost bands for a period of five years from the date of this
Decision.  After this five-year period, these facilities will not be subject to
mandatory unbundling or essential facilities rating.  In the Commission's view, this
approach will permit entry at a pace that will better serve the public interest and,
at the same time, provide incentives to CLECs to undertake construction or
acquisition of facilities.
The commission also concludes that the rates for essential facilities should be based on
incremental cost plus a 25% mark-up, the latter allowing to compensate for fixed common costs.
It is claimed (in 125) that the resulting tariff rate would not be very different form one based on
the TELRIC method. In any case, there should be a single tariff rate that applies to both the
incumbent operator himself and to its competitors (130).
In comparison with the Dutch case (see section 5), we see that the regulated price includes a
relatively higher mark-up, and that, in Canada, there is no gradual transition.
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9. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have addressed several aspects of the question “is competition
between infrastructure providers in the local loop a conditio sine qua non for
effective competition in the telecommunications market?” We have seen that the
answer is not a straightforward one and that the regulator faces challenging
problems. We have argued that the benefits of competition should not be
underestimated and that the “dangers” of duplication of network cost should not
be overestimated. We have pointed out the risks involved in overregulation, in
particular because of the fact that pessimistic beliefs on the part of the regulator
may easily spread to potential entrants and may thus become a self-fulfilling
prophecy: if the local loop is considered to be a natural monopoly and is regulated
accordingly, then the local loop may indeed remain an actual monopoly as
investments in alternative infrastructure will not be profitable.
In the foregoing sections we have discussed in detail some of the problems that
a telecommunications regulator has to deal with. We have attempted to highlight
the trade-offs involved, with emphasis being on the risks involved in the regulator
leading the market, rather than the other way around. Rather than repeating these
arguments here, we wish to move back to the more general level, to the discussion
between the pros and cons of service competition versus infrastructure
competition, to a comparison of the UK-model with the US-model.
Observers of the US-telecommunications market generally agree that thus far the
1996 telecommunications act has not yet brought what was expected, i.e. there is
almost no competition in local markets yet, and it has become abundantly clear
that it will take a long time before these local markets will become competitive.
Perhaps, the take-over of cable companies such as Telecommunications Inc. and
Media One by AT&T (a process that is taking place at present) will speed up this
process. Indeed, according to analysists AT&T has identified cable as having the
best broadband access into US-homes, thus enabling AY&T to compete in local
telephone service and modern telecommunications.
38 OFTEL market research report “Towards better telecoms for costumers, 1998 progress
report” February 1999
39 OECD “Regulatory reform in the telecommunications industry: the Netherlands.” Draft,
September, 1998.
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In contrast, observers are generally more enthusiastic about competition in the UK
telephone market. While also in the UK it has taken time for competition to
develop (in this respect, the duopoly policy is now seen as a major mistake),
competition in the UK is a reality now, also in the local market. Furthermore,
competition is developing rapidly. For example, in its most recent (February 1999)
market research report , OFTEL states:38
“10. By October 1998, cable companies had laid cable in roads passing nearly 12
million households offering direct-to-the-home telecoms connections. This
represents a 15% increase in one year in the number of homes with access to cable
telephony: around 50% of households in the UK now have the choice of a cable
operator to provide telecoms service.”
“11. Take up of cable telephone lines by residential costumers was 3.4 million at
October 1998, a 23% increase after October 1997. Cable companies are due to
have passed 60% of households by the end of 2001.”
Hence, it follows that approximately 30% of those households who at present
could use cable telephony do actually make use of cable telephony, showing that
competition can develop and that cable companies can offer an attractive deal to
consumers.
The above figures have to be viewed in light of the fact that cable companies in
the UK have had to make considerable investments to make this happen, as the
cable penetration ratio in the UK was low before. In this respect, the starting
situation in the Netherlands for cable based infrastructure competition to develop
is more favorable. This is realised by the OECD in its 1998 report on regulatory
reform in the Dutch telecommunications industry :39
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“15. The Dutch CATV industry is potentially a strong source of competition for
the local loop. Virtually 100 per cent of households are passed by cable networks
in the Netherlands and about 94 per cent are connected to cable networks.”
“93. As in all countries, local service competition presents more significant
barriers to entry. In the Netherlands, the existence of a virtually ubiquitous CATV
network presents an obvious alternative to the bottleneck of the local loop. CATV
operators in other countries (most notably the UK) are already successfully
offering voice telephony services. Indeed, in the Netherlands, A2000 has been
offering voice telephony over its cable network in the Netherlands since 1997.
Although at present only 5 cable companies have successfully concluded
interconnection agreements, it is expected that this number will significantly
increase.”
Given the favorable starting position, the question is how to realize the potential.
Certainly, regulatory action should be geared towards this and should not create
artificial barriers. In this respect, the warning the OECD issues against excessive
unbundling requirements deserves to be repeated:
“48. Forcing a firm to make its facilities available to a competitor at regulated
prices is a relatively significant regulatory intervention whose scope should be
strictly limited. Such intervention poses serious dangers of distorting incentives
on the part of facilities owners for further investment in upgrading or R&D.
Special access should only be granted to facilities which are clearly essential
facilities. In contrast, it appears that the intention in the Netherlands is to make
special access available on a significantly wider basis.”
“53. In addition, the provisions related to special access are currently being
interpreted broadly to require more unbundling than is strictly necessary. Facilities
should only be unbundled when they are essential facilities as defined in the EU
competition law. Consideration should be given, therefore, to scaling back these
provisions.”
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Taking into account the favorable developments in the UK and the favorable
starting position in the Netherlands, the advise that one could give to the Dutch
OPTA is to look across the North Sea and to orient itself towards its UK
counterpart OFTEL.
